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**NOT JUST “FRANCO’S SPAIN”:
THE SPANISH POLITICAL LANDSCAPE THROUGH THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
PACT OF MADRID**

JACOB FOX WATKINS

INTRODUCTION

Spain during the thirty–six year dictatorship of General Francisco Franco Bahamonde cannot simply be viewed as “Franco’s Spain.” While Franco certainly maintained supreme authority, the wide array of political factions and ideologies that define the country during both the Spanish Civil War and its transition to democracy did not cease to exist. The historiography of Francoist Spain in English, as part of broader scholarship on the Cold War, understandably focuses on the United States’ motivations for signing the Pact of Madrid. By virtue of its US-centric approach, this historiography tends to promote the mistakenly monolithic perspective of the Spanish political landscape. Historiography in Spanish, meanwhile, portrays a more complex view of Spain during its re-emergence; in the early 1950’s, when the signing of the Pact of Madrid secured the country a renewed place on the international stage following years of political sequestration by western, democratic nations.

However, the historiography still tends to treat all domestic, conservative political factions as a single homogenous entity. In this way, the differing and often opposing motives, perspectives, and interpretations within the governing political right are largely lost or confused. This work complicates the English language Cold War historiography and expands on existing Spanish scholarship by closely examining the different perspectives about the Pact of Madrid held by distinct conservative factions in Spain.

In this project, I break away from the standard practice of interpreting Spain under Franco as simply “Franco’s Spain.” I examine how adherents to various conservative political ideologies in Spanish society understood this critical moment of Spain’s re-emergence. The Pact was such a significant event that it invoked reactions from all of the political factions in Spain. As such, the Pact serves as a litmus test that can be applied to different elements of contemporary Spanish society. By evaluating their subtly divergent responses to the event we can infer much about their specific perspectives.

Newspapers were the public face of many of these ideologically distinct groups. I investigate how disparate groups framed the culminating moment of re-emergence, the signing of the Pact of Madrid, in the press, and what such framing reveals about their own political opinions and motives. This project particularly examines the perspectives of three groups through daily newspapers that articulated different perspectives: the *Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista* (the only legal political party), monarchists, and capitalist-minded businessmen. These groups were chosen both because of their relative prominence and the availability of primary source documents. In analysing the three groups' respective newspapers, this project presents the dissimilar framings of the Pact of Madrid by Spanish press in order to reveal the differing ideologies of various factions in Spanish society and to combat the image of Franco's Spain as homogeneous and monolithically fascist.

THE STATE SPEAKS: ARRIBA AND FRANCO'S POLITICAL PARTY

General Franco allowed only one legal political party in Spain, the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (FET y de las JONS). *Arriba* was their daily newspaper and thus also one of the official organs of the regime.¹ The newspaper presented the news through an avowed Falangist lens. *Arriba* played the central role in tailoring and disseminating information to support the policies of the Franco government. In this dual capacity, *Arriba* was the newspaper most representative of the regime's narrative. Its coverage of the signing of the Pact of Madrid centered on three core subjects: the Pact's strategic value, its service as a vehicle for international recognition, and, crucially, its role as evidence of a partnership with the United States of America.

Franco achieved a major political coup with the signing of the Pact of Madrid on September 26, 1953. The Francoist government got a commitment for significant military and economic aid from the Eisenhower administration. This was in exchange for permitting American naval and air bases to be stationed on Spanish territory, thereby including Spain in the growing US security umbrella.² Franco gained not only the military might to maintain power but also a much needed influx of capital to restart Spain's flagging economy. Moreover, Franco soon achieved a degree of recognition and respect from western nations that he had not yet enjoyed, having been politically shunned by most Western European

¹ "Órgano de Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las J.O.N.S." *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 5.

² Department of State, "Economic Aid Agreement," *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955; Basic Documents*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957). 1696-1698.

nations since the end of World War II, through these high-profile international agreements.

Finally, Franco used the apparent willingness of the United States to collaborate with Spain to justify his ideological convictions; His military triumph over leftist ideologies in the Spanish Civil War was just a prologue to the fight against international communism, and the United States had finally recognized the righteousness of his cause. *Arriba* presented this version of the Pact, capitalizing on a significant diplomatic achievement to bolster Franco's legitimacy to a domestic audience.

Arriba carefully crafted its coverage of the Pact of Madrid to present it as evidence of Spanish power and respectability. Specifically, the newspaper presented a unique military framing. It stressed all of the strategic advantages of the Pact and praised Franco for increasing the country's security. Meanwhile, *Arriba* largely ignored the economic aid component of the Pact, hesitant to admit that Franco's autarkic policies had stunted growth.

This triumphal narrative, of course, obfuscated the realities of the Pact itself. While hailed as evidence of an equal Spanish–American partnership, in truth the agreements were heavily one–sided. President Eisenhower knew that Franco was so unpopular among Congressional Democrats that a Spanish–American defense treaty would never be ratified.³ Instead, he utilized executive agreements, which avoided the Congressional approval process and which could be rescinded by a later executive order. This decision was a shrewd political tactic. By issuing an executive agreement over pursuing a treaty, Eisenhower gave moderate and left-leaning Democrats the ability to voice their displeasure without forcing a vote that would have, in his opinion, harmed the United States' defense apparatus.⁴ The placement of US bases inside Spanish borders, and the subsequent deployment of nuclear weapons, turned the country into a target if the Cold War should become hot. However, the structure of executive agreements — unlike a treaty — did not bind the United States to actually defend Spain in case of Soviet aggression. Moreover, Spain was in dire economic straits in the early 1950's. Economic aid was an absolute necessity and, in negotiations, the Spanish government made such aid a priority.⁵

³ Arturo Jarque Íñiguez, “*Queremos esas bases*”: *el acercamiento de Estados Unidos a la España de Franco* (Alcalá: Centro de Estudios Norteamericanos, Universidad de Alcalá 1998), 219–220.

⁴ In this chapter I am referring to Congressional Democrats as single political entity. Importantly, some senators who made up the influential pro-Franco “Spanish Lobby” were Democrats. However, for the sake of simplicity I am not referring to them here.

⁵ Please see my Chapter Three for a discussion of Spain's economic situation in the early 1950's.

Ultimately, *Arriba's* coverage, aimed at legitimizing the Francoist state, and Franco himself, was purposefully myopic; claiming the Pact was proof of military and diplomatic might when the unequal structure of the agreements and the absolute necessity of the economic aid stipulation revealed the true shortcomings of the Franco government.

ARRIBA: MOUTHPIECE OF THE REGIME

José Antonio Primo de Rivera, founder of the fascist Falange Española (FE), launched *Arriba* on March 21st, 1935.⁶ The newspaper originally acted as the official organ of the Falange Española de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (FE de las JONS), a fascist party created when, in 1934, Primo de Rivera's FE merged with the rival JONS.⁷

During the Civil War, the FE de las JONS sided with Franco's Nationalists. On April 20th, 1937, the Nationalist government in Burgos published Decree 255.⁸ This decree dissolved all political parties in Nationalist-controlled territory, merging the existing fascist FE de las JONS, the monarchist, Carlist *Comunión Tradicionalista*, and the various Catholic parties into a "sole political entity." This new party was dubbed the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista.⁹

While this new umbrella organization incorporated fascist, Catholic, and the Carlist and Alfonsist monarchist groups, it was truly dominated by none. Rather, it came to resemble Franco's own distinct form of traditionalist authoritarianism with fascist trappings; Franco's political style, though always retaining fundamental principles of authoritarianism, nationalism, traditionalism and Catholicism, was always eclectic. He demonstrated no interest in Falangism before the civil war...Franco was never a "core fascist" or a genuine Falangist,

⁶ Francisco Javier Davara Torrego, "Los periódicos españoles en el tardo franquismo. Consecuencias de la nueva ley de prensa," *Comunicación y Hombre: revista interdisciplinar de ciencias de la comunicación y humanidades*, no. 1 (2005): 134.

⁷ Stanley G. Payne, *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 47.

⁸ Administración Gobierno Civil de Burgos, "Decreto 255" in *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, 2, no 182 (April 20, 1937): 1.

⁹ Starting in 1943, the F.E.T. y de las J.O.N.S. referred to itself as a movement, not a political party. In the interest of clarity I exclusively use the term party. While both Alfonsists and Carlists advocated the institution of monarchy and were included in the F.E.T. y de las J.O.N.S., they supported different claimants to the throne and were generally at odds with one another.

and never personally espoused or gave any priority to all the goals of the Falangists...¹⁰

Franco ruled through a coalition of right wing, yet wildly divergent, ideologies and groups. His own political beliefs in many ways reflected the diversity of political belief structures that persisted in the country even after the end of the Civil War. Correspondingly, the FET y de las JONS was not a solely fascist organization and *Arriba* was not the expression of a single political ideology. It was a representation of the eclectic, right wing ideology of the regime and its leader.

Madrid finally fell to the Nationalist forces on March 28, 1939. *Arriba* resumed publication the next day.¹¹ While *Arriba* began as the organ of a single fascist party prior to the war, Franco converted it into the mouthpiece of the sole legal political party and, arguably, the official organ of the regime.

“LOS MÁS MODERNOS AVIONES AMERICANOS SE ESTACIONARÁN EN LAS BASES ESPAÑOLAS”¹²

The F.E.T. y de las J.O.N.S. employed *Arriba* to promote the state’s perspective on current events. The first issue that covered the Pact was available on Sunday, September 27, 1953.¹³ It devoted three and a half pages to printing in their entirety the public version of the three executive agreements.¹⁴ The inclusion of not just a journalistic summary, but also the texts themselves illustrates that the regime saw the Pact as a development of paramount importance: a significant diplomatic achievement they wanted to laud to the Spanish population. Interspersed in the coverage were a number of congratulatory articles with headlines such as “The Pact has Fortified the Defense

¹⁰ Stanley G. Payne, *Fascism in Spain, 1923–1977*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999), 477.

¹¹ Davara Torrego, “Los periódicos españoles,” 135.

¹² “The most modern American planes will be stationed in Spanish bases.” [“Los más modernos aviones americanos se estacionarán en las bases españolas.”] *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 11.

¹³ Newspapers in Spain at this time were typically written and printed the night before publication. Thus, the September 27 edition was completed on the night of Saturday, September 26, the day of the signing of the Pact. Moreover, as most businesses, newspapers included, did not operate on Sundays, no Monday edition was published. This holds true for every newspaper examined in this project. Therefore, the first two days of coverage are Sunday, September 27 and Tuesday, September 29, and were printed on Saturday, September 26 and Monday, September 28, respectively. *Arriba* September 27, 1953, 6–9.

¹⁴ A secret note to Article III of the defense agreement was not publicly available at this time. The secret note is discussed, in detail, later in this chapter.

of Europe” and “The Spanish Progress in the Last Four Years is Impressive.”¹⁵ The flowery prose of these articles leaves the reader with a clearly positive outlook; the Pact was good for Europe, the West, and Spain herself. *Arriba*’s first significant argument about the importance of the Pact was that it was a major advantage to the *military* strength and security of Spain and the West.

Arriba argued the strategic importance of the Pact of Madrid through an almost exclusively militaristic narrative. The newspaper was quick to highlight — and overstate — the value of the new Spanish–American agreements to the developing NATO and US security umbrella. For example, the headline from September 27th declared “Spain and North America Signed Yesterday Three Agreements in which the Preparation of the West for the Maintenance of Peace and Security is Reinforced.”¹⁶ Crucially, here *Arriba* equated peace with security through expansion of the United States’ military presence in the Mediterranean. The defense agreement, one of the three executive agreements that constitute the Pact of Madrid, laid out a program whereby Spain would permit the United States to build and operate military bases on Spanish territory in exchange for significant military and economic aid:

1. On the part of the United States, the support of Spanish defense efforts for agreed purposes by providing military end item assistance to Spain during a period of several years to contribute to the effective air defense of Spain and to improve the equipment of its military and naval forces to the extent to be agreed upon in technical discussions in the light of the circumstances, and with the cooperation of the resources of Spanish industry to the extent possible. Such support will be conditioned as in the case of other friendly nations by the priorities and limitations due to the international commitments of the United States and the exigencies of the international situation and will be subject to Congressional appropriations.

2. In consequence of the above stated premises and for the same agreed purposes, the Government of Spain authorizes the Government of the United States, subject to terms and conditions to be agreed, to develop, maintain and utilize for military purposes, jointly with the Government of Spain, such areas and facilities in territory under Spanish jurisdiction as may be agreed upon by the competent authorities of both Governments as necessary for the purposes of this agreement.¹⁷

¹⁵ “El pacto ha fortalecido la defensa de Europa,” *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 8: “El progreso español en los últimos cuatro años es impresionante,” *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 9.

¹⁶ “España y Norteamérica firmaron ayer tres acuerdos en ellos se refuerza la preparación de Occidente para el mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad,” *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 5.

¹⁷ Department of State, “Defense Agreement,” *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955; Basic Documents*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957). 1696-1698.

Four bases were eventually built: three US Air Force bases at Torrejón de Ardoz, Zaragoza and Morón de la Frontera and a US Navy base at the port of Rota.¹⁸ *Arriba* included a number of articles that reinforced its perspective that the Pact was strategically invaluable: “London recognizes today...one of the most important gaps in the strategic terrain of the western front is now filled.”¹⁹

Arriba drew attention to the impending creation of US military bases in Spain. The newspaper claimed, on September 27th, that the

immediate effect that the signing of the agreement has for the United States is [for Spain] to offer to the North American fleet in the Mediterranean naval bases in El Ferrol, Cadiz, Cartagena, Valencia and Mahón. The centers in which the [Air Force] bases will be positioned have still not been revealed, but it is confirmed that they will be strategic locations in the [Iberian] Peninsula located near Madrid, Barcelona and Seville.²⁰

Arriba's readiness to discuss the establishment of foreign bases exposed the regime's military narrative. The newspaper portrayed any development that potentially increased the strength of the Spanish military, either through aid or collaboration with US forces, positively. *Arriba* listed far more likely locations for bases than the US eventually used. This demonstrates the willingness of the Francoist state to cede territory to the United States through base agreements. Moreover, it illustrates that the government either overestimated the importance of the Pact to the United States, or simply wanted to inflate its value for domestic consumption. Either way, *Arriba*, and by extension the Franco government, placed paramount importance on the military aspects of the Pact of Madrid.

¹⁸ William Chislett, “Spain and the United States: The Quest for Mutual Rediscovery,” *Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos* (2005): 17. See Appendix I for map of base locations.

¹⁹ “London reconoce hoy que en virtud del pacto se colma ahora una de las lagunas más importantes en los terrenos estratégico y militar del frente occidental.” Guy Bueno, “Inglaterra ‘ha recibido con serenidad’ la firma de los acuerdos,” *Arriba*, September 29, 1953, 11.

²⁰ “El efecto inmediato que la firma del acuerdo tiene para los Estados Unidos es ofrecer a la flota norteamericana en el Mediterráneo bases navales en El Ferrol, Cádiz, Cartagena, Valencia y Mahón. Los centros en que las bases aéreas estarán emplazadas no se dieron a conocer todavía, pero se afirma que serán lugares estratégicos de la península ubicados cerca de Madrid, Barcelona y Sevilla.” Rodrigo Royo, “La firma del acuerdo, titulada a toda plana en la prensa norteamericana,” *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 5.

Arriba enhanced this military focus when it detailed Spain's aid package. The newspaper reported that \$141 million would be dedicated to military aid in the form of loans and preferential pricing on US equipment.²¹ Adjusted for inflation to the equivalent value in 2014 dollars, this amounts to roughly \$1.24 billion.²² *Arriba* took every opportunity to suggest that this aid would modernize the Spanish military and restore its competitiveness on an international level. The newspaper proclaimed that, as a result of the Pact, "The Most Modern American Planes Will be Stationed in Spanish Bases," even suggesting that Spain would soon be able to purchase the US B-47 bomber.²³ Clearly, *Arriba* gauged the value of the Pact by its promise to increase Spain's military security, both through direct aid and by association with the United States.

By contrast, the newspaper actually downplayed the economic aid component of the agreements. One of the three executive agreements, the "Economic Aid Agreement between the United States of America and Spain," solely dealt with the loans, tax waivers, and trade incentives that were granted to Spain in return for permitting the creation of US military bases. Yet, *Arriba* only referred to the economic aid in passing, and always within a military narrative. When detailing the aid package, the newspaper stated, "[\\$]141 million will be used on military spending and the eighty-five *remaining* [emphasis mine] will be destined to fortify the economic base of the program of military cooperation."²⁴ By using the word "remaining" (*restante*) *Arriba* subtly implied that the economic stimulus was merely an afterthought. Further, the newspaper suggested that even this economic aid was really just another way to reinforce and ensure continued *military* cooperation between Spain and the United States. In one article, titled "Modernization of Transport and Communication," *Arriba* framed its discussion of infrastructure modernization afforded for by the economic aid in terms of its potential to improve military readiness and efficiency.²⁵ In truth, the Pact eventually provided far more economic than military aid. Between 1953 and

²¹ "España y Norteamérica firmaron ayer tres acuerdos en ellos se refuerza la preparación de Occidente para el mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad," *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 5.

²² This figure was derived using the US Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics' cost of living index calculator. Therefore, it demonstrates the value of this aid in terms of US purchasing power, as opposed to relative Spanish purchasing power. United States Department of Labor, CPI Inflation Calculator. http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm

²³ "Los más modernos aviones americanos se estacionarán en las bases españolas," *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 11.

²⁴ \$744 million, adjusted for inflation: "141 millones serán utilizados en gastos militares y los 85 *restantes* [emphasis mine] serán destinados a fortalecer la base económica del programa de cooperación militar," "España y Norteamérica firmaron ayer tres acuerdos en ellos se refuerza la preparación de Occidente para el mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad," *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 5.

²⁵ "Modernización de los transportes y las comunicaciones," *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 11.

1963, the United States provided over \$1.5 billion in economic aid, while only affording \$521 million in military aid.²⁶

By downplaying the value of the economic stimulus, *Arriba* was able to assert that Spain's collaboration with the United States had not been borne out of necessity, but rather was a natural alliance between the democratic nations of the West. An editorial on the first page of *Arriba*'s September 30th edition reminded readers that the aid provided for in the Pact was not a "golden rain."²⁷ Another article proclaimed that, according to the world press, "Spain Has Not Been Seduced by the Lure of the Dollar."²⁸ In reality, however, the need for economic stimulus had been a major factor in negotiations. In a telegram to the US Ambassador in Madrid on May 6, 1952, Secretary of State Dean Acheson made repeated references to exorbitant Spanish requests for aid:

[Spanish General] Vigon memo Apr 26 gives impressions Spans [sic] desire massive aid as *quid pro quo* for US use mil facilities in Spain. Their specific desires as indicated Vigon memo are of course far in excess our capabilities... If discussion more specific *quid pro quo* required, Spans shld [sic] not be permitted lose sight of fact aid we are now discussing includes, in addition mil [sic] aid, substantial econ aid program.²⁹

By 1953, Spain's lackluster overseas trade, nearly non-existent economic growth, and the Francoist state's own autarkic economic policy had strangled the Spanish economy. The Franco regime desperately needed an influx of capital and used the Pact of Madrid as a means to rehabilitate the domestic economy, and thereby reinforce its legitimacy.

Arriba's attempts to marginalize the economic aid reveals how insecure the Spanish government felt on this point. Economic aid was an absolute necessity; yet asking for it meant admitting that the state's own policies had failed. Accordingly, *Arriba* detailed the Pact from a military perspective. The

²⁶ Not adjusted for inflation. - William Chislett, "Spain," 21-23.

²⁷ "Editorial: Sin lluvia de oro," *Arriba*, September 30, 1953, 7.

²⁸ The inclusion of the sexualized word, "seduce," here relates to the common practice of feminizing France and asserting a fascist masculine ideal of Spain through militarization. While this purposeful gendering is deserving of study, it falls outside the scope of this project. "España no se ha dejado seducir por el cebo de los dólares," *Arriba*, September 20, 1953, 8.

²⁹ Dean Acheson, "Document 855: Telegram, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Spain," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume VI, Part 2, Western Europe and Canada*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 6, 1952). 1849-1850.

newspaper portrayed it as a step towards security and western defense while avoiding any mention of the economic mismanagement that it, in part, addressed.

“LOS ACUERDOS DE MADRID HAN PUESTO FIN AL OSTRACISMO ESPAÑOL”³⁰

Arriba's coverage of the Pact of Madrid paid great attention to its reception abroad, both in the West and in the Eastern Bloc. The newspaper expounded on the severe and negative response from the Soviet Union, and the nations under Soviet influence. Further, *Arriba* portrayed a primarily positive and optimistic representation of the Pact in western, specifically European, press. *Arriba*, crucially, included articles aimed at positioning the Pact within the recent historical context. Namely, how the US and European nations that had shunned Spain since the end of the Civil War.³¹ Taken together, these representations portray a defiant and triumphant Spain. The Francoist state had steadfastly held to its fervent anti-communist ideology. Now the US and Western Europe had come around to the regime's way of thinking. Ultimately, *Arriba* invoked the international reception of the Pact to document the ideological supremacy of the Francoist state.

From the very first day of coverage, September 27, 1953, *Arriba* made reference to the strong opposition by European nations to a Spanish–American *rapprochement*. In one article, positioned on the page immediately after the text of the Pact itself, a byline proclaimed, “England and France were the countries most firmly opposed to the understanding between the two nations [Spain and the United States].”³² The article alleged that European nations, namely Great Britain and France, had been the driving force behind the United States' decision to exclude Spain from the Marshall Plan and similar programs in the post–WWII international system. Moreover, it insinuated that the European nations' true motive for Spanish exclusion was to secure a greater share of the Marshall Plan funds. In this way, *Arriba* casts its European detractors as greedy, and the Marshall Plan as a form of welfare assistance. It did this even as it implied that the Francoist state had neither wanted nor needed such a handout. This chronicle of European opposition subtly suggested that, in signing agreements with the Franco regime, the United States had gravitated closer to Spain and *away* from its traditional — and greedy — European allies.

³⁰ “The agreements of Madrid have put an end to Spanish ostracism.” “Los Acuerdos de Madrid han puesto fin al ostracismo español,” *Arriba*, September 29, 1953, 9.

³¹ This political shunning is discussed at length in Chapter Three.

³² “Inglaterra y Francia fueron los países que más firmemente se opusieron al entendimiento entre las dos naciones.” “Breve historia de los convenios Hispano–Norteamericanos,” *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 10.

Arriba began including quotes from foreign press to portray the international reception of the Pact starting on its second day of coverage, September 29, 1953. The front page that day led with an article using a headline taken from *Le Monde*, the prestigious French newspaper: “‘Spain has chosen the alliance, but not vassalage’ says ‘Le Monde’.”³³ The subheading continued in a similarly positive manner: “The Spanish government joins [the NATO security umbrella] with a dignity that other western nations could envy.” Here *Arriba* not only illustrated a positive reception abroad, but boasted Spanish supremacy over other European countries in its relationship to the *de facto* western superpower. The newspaper continued, relaying positive reviews of the Pact from press in England, France, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Philippines, Portugal, various Latin American countries and, of course, the United States.³⁴ While most nations were only mentioned in passing, the reception in each of the larger European countries received a dedicated article. One article, “It seems that Europe does not end in the Pyrenees” reported that journalists in Paris were struggling to demonstrate to readers the error of shunning Spain.³⁵ Another, “England ‘has received with serenity’ the signing of the agreements,” spoke of an English populace resigned to the necessity of the Pact.³⁶ Finally, an article titled “Italy has perceived the Spanish dignity and solidity” claimed that Italian press understood the Pact as “one of the most unique international understandings.”³⁷

Arriba also included some negative reviews from Soviet press. The newspaper claimed that the Kremlin felt threatened by the Pact, which they claimed would harm the stability of the region.³⁸ This inclusion reinforced the perceived value of the Pact of Madrid, rather than serving as a concession or an attempt at balanced reporting. Antagonizing the Soviet Union was one way for

³³ EFE, “‘España ha escogido la alianza, pero no el Vasallaje’ dice ‘Le Monde,’” *Arriba*, September 29, 1953, 5.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 5. “Los Acuerdos de Madrid han puesto fin al ostracismo español,” *Arriba*, September 29, 1953, 9.: “El Kremlin ha acusado el golpe inferido al comunismo por el pacto hispanonorteamericano,” *Arriba*, September 29, 1953, 10.

³⁵ This is a reference to the French expression that “Africa starts at the Pyrenees.” The phrase serves to relegate Spain (and Portugal) to relative insignificance and exclude it from the European sphere by associating it with the African continent. Silva A. Marín, “Parece que Europa no acaba en los Pirineos,” *Arriba*, September 29, 1953, 10.

³⁶ Guy Bueno, “Inglaterra ‘ha recibido con serenidad’ la firma de los acuerdos,” *Arriba*, September 29, 1953, 11.

³⁷ Luis de la Barga, “Italia ha percibido la dignidad y firmeza españolas,” *Arriba*, September 29, 1953, 11.

³⁸ EFE, “El Kremlin ha acusado el golpe inferido al comunismo por el pacto hispanonorteamericano,” *Arriba*, September 29, 1953, 10.

the staunchly conservative Franco regime to draw legitimacy. *Arriba*'s inclusion of Soviet criticism, therefore, was another way of underscoring the Pact's value.

The numerous articles on the positive reception of the Pact in Europe were juxtaposed with repeated allusions to the political ostracism of Spain by the same countries. A banner headline on September 29th read, "The Agreements of Madrid Have Put an End to the Ostracism of Spain."³⁹ Underneath this headline, *Arriba* ran most of its articles regarding positive European reception. By reminding readers of Europe's refusal to work with Spain in the same breath that it relayed the praise of these same nations, *Arriba* was really accusing these Western European states of being hypocritical. These nations may have condemned Franco for his heavy-handed tactics but, when faced with the threat of Soviet aggression, they were more than willing to accept incorporating Spain into the US and NATO security umbrella (albeit not as a true member).

This accusatory tone, moreover, implied a sense of jealousy on the part of Europeans. In arguing that the Marshall Plan was a form of welfare and then touting European, but particularly French, assertions that Spain had avoided "vassalage," *Arriba* presented the US aid Spain would receive as totally distinct from the aid other European nations had enjoyed. The aid prescribed in the Pact of Madrid was by no means a form of welfare. While Western European nations had needed to take a handout from the United States in order to survive in the post-war period, Spain was simply being properly compensated for its role in the struggle against communism. This account, of course, fit nicely with the ideological underpinnings of the Francoist state.

Near the end of the World War II, members of the regime understood that Spain would be politically shunned as punishment for its alignment towards the Axis powers. Members high in the hierarchy believed that the best course would be to hold fast to their strict conservative ideology and to wait for the rest of the world to recognize the specter of Soviet communism. In a note to Franco, Luis Carrero Blanco, then undersecretary to the President, stated that

the pressures of the Anglo-Saxons for a political change [in Spain] that breaks the normal development of the actual regime will be so small when [faced with] our order, our unity and our impassibility before indications, threats and impertinence. The only formula for us can be no other than order, unity and to hold out.⁴⁰

³⁹ "Los Acuerdos de Madrid han puesto fin al ostracismo español," *Arriba*, September 29, 1953, 9.

⁴⁰ General Franco was also the President of Spain. - "...las presiones de los anglosajones por un cambio en la política española que rompa el normal desarrollo del régimen actual serían tanto menores cuanto más palpable sea nuestro orden, nuestra unidad y nuestra impassibilidad ante

In the face of mounting external political condemnation, the regime's leadership had chosen to, simply, put up with it (*aguantar*) and wait for the world to change its mind. Luckily for them, the United States eventually did. The US chose Cold War *realpolitik* considerations over its moral opposition to Franco and his administration. For the Francoist state the Pact of Madrid was a vindication of its post-war policies. Spain held out and would now reap the rewards of the ideological purity of its opposition to communism.

According to *Arriba*, that reward was the military aid provided for in the Pact of Madrid. Western Europe's aid was welfare; a bribe to float their economies and ensure they stayed within the United States' sphere of influence. By contrast, the Franco regime was being fairly compensated for services rendered. The Pact was a long overdue payment for Spain's fight against communist expansion. From the Franco government's perspective, European nations were jealous that the United States treated them as supplicants while it viewed Spain as a trusted ally.

In this way *Arriba* did not use international recognition of the Pact as evidence of Spanish re-integration into the European sphere. Rather, the Pact was proof of the legitimacy and supremacy of the Francoist state's ideological convictions *over* the rest of Europe.

““ESPAÑA HA ESCOGIDO LA ALIANZA, PERO NO EL VASALLAJE””

On its September 27, 1953 cover, the first day of coverage, the newspaper included a photo of General Franco positioned above one of President Eisenhower, subtly conveying that Franco was superior and more important than Eisenhower. The text between the photos presented the Pact of Madrid stating, “...Spain and the United States of America...can mutually celebrate this agreement that, particularly for our fatherland, will achieve a step ahead in world prestige, independent power, and immense possibilities for the future.”⁴¹

indicaciones, amenazas e impertinencias. La única fórmula para nosotros no puede ser otra que: orden, unidad y aguantar.” Notes by Luis Carrero Blanco to Francisco Franco in August of 1945, reproduced in Ángel Viñas, *En las garras del águila: los pactos con Estados Unidos, de Francisco Franco a Felipe González (1945–1995)* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2003), 28–29.

⁴¹ “España y los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, en las figuras del Caudillo Franco y del Presidente Eisenhower pueden celebrar mutuamente este compromiso que, particularmente para nuestra Patria, conseguirá un paso más e su prestigio mundial en su poder de independencia y en sus inmensas posibilidades de futuro.” *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 5.

The newspaper claimed that the agreements were of mutual (*mutual/mutualmente*) importance, but that they were more beneficial to Spain than the United States. In this small caption, *Arriba* deftly conveyed its primary argument about the Pact of Madrid; that it evidenced a renewed and powerful Spanish–American partnership, but one in which Spain held the upper hand.

Arriba presented the Pact of Madrid as evidence of a burgeoning partnership between Spain and the United States. The newspaper repeatedly quoted terms from the Pact itself, such as the word “jointly” (*conjunto/conjuntamente*), which reinforced this notion of partnership.⁴² *Arriba* also attempted to position the Pact within a historical context with two articles, “Hispano–American Agreements and Conventions in effect signed since 1944,” and “Brief History of the Hispano–American conventions.”⁴³ In these articles, *Arriba* detailed recent agreements between the two nations and placed the blame for a lack of deeper connection on interference from Western European nations. This gave the reader the impression that the United States had been slowly working towards closer relations with Spain, even if that meant upsetting relations with the rest of Europe.

Further, *Arriba*’s frequent mentions of the military aid and advantages of the Pact, detailed above, reinforced the importance of the partnership.⁴⁴ Spain was now aligned with one of the world’s two major developers of military equipment and would have unprecedented access to its technology. Through this narrative, *Arriba* asserted both the existence of a true Spanish–American partnership and its relative importance compared to similar European–American relationships.

Yet, *Arriba* did not simply tout the importance of the new Spanish–American partnership. Rather, the newspaper went so far as to insinuate that Spain had achieved a degree of supremacy *over* the United States. When referring to this partnership, *Arriba* always listed Spain before the United States, subtly placing a higher importance on the former: “Spain and the United States,” “Spanish–American Agreements.”⁴⁵

⁴² “...y uso conjunto.” “España y Norteamérica firmaron ayer tres acuerdos en ellos se refuerza la preparación de Occidente para el mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad,” *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 5.

⁴³ “Acuerdos y Convenios vigentes hispano–norteamericanos firmados desde 1944.” *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 10.: “Breve historia de los convenios Hispano–Norteamericanos,” *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 10.

⁴⁴ “Estados Unidos apoyará el esfuerzo defensivo español.” *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 9.

⁴⁵ *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 5–8; *Arriba*, September 29, 1953, 6–11; *Arriba*, September 30, 1953, 5.

Further, many of the articles that detailed the content of the Pact were framed to highlight Spain as a net receiver of goods and benefits. The headline over the article containing the text of the defense agreement read, “United States will help the Spanish defense effort.”⁴⁶ Written this way, the bases are presented not as an expansion of US military presence, but rather as a bolstering of *Spanish* military preparedness. This narrative is prevalent throughout *Arriba*’s coverage.

Crucially, *Arriba* frequently mentioned that the bases would remain under Spanish sovereignty. Article III of the defense agreement of the Pact of Madrid specifically states, “The area which by virtue of this Agreement, are prepared for joint utilization, will remain under Spanish flag and command...The time and manner of wartime utilization of said areas and facilities will be as mutually agreed upon.”⁴⁷ *Arriba* was quick to reiterate that the bases, while built by the United States, would “remain in every case under Spanish sovereignty and control.”⁴⁸ If true, this would have meant that Spain had managed to secure a major defense agreement with the US without ceding any territorial sovereignty, unlike any of the other nations in the US security umbrella, which “represent[ed] a Spanish diplomatic success ‘of considerable international significance.’”⁴⁹

In reality, however, a secret additional note to Article III of the defense agreement negated Spanish sovereignty. The note allowed the United States to take unilateral initiative and action from the bases without giving prior notice or receiving consent from the Franco government. In effect, this meant that the US could engage in a Cold War conflict, thereby making Spain a target, with impunity. Moreover, in the early 1950’s, the United States’ nuclear capability depended on its fleet of B-47 (and later B-52) bombers. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was yet capable of reaching one another in a direct nuclear strike. The Iberian Peninsula was, therefore, a perfect location from which to maintain a nuclear arsenal that, in turn, made it a prime target in the event of Soviet aggression. The additional note to Article III was not made public until 1977, meaning that *Arriba*’s argument hinging on Spanish retention of

⁴⁶ “Estados Unidos apoyará el esfuerzo defensivo español.” *Arriba*. September 27, 1953, 9.

⁴⁷ Department of State, “Defense Agreement,” *American Foreign Policy. 1950-1955; Basic Documents*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957). 1696-1698.

⁴⁸ “Las instalaciones utilizadas permanecerán en todo caso bajo la soberanía y el mando españoles” “España y Norteamérica firmaron ayer tres acuerdos en ellos se refuerza la preparación de Occidente para el mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad,” *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 5.

⁴⁹ “...representa un éxito de la diplomacia española ‘de considerable significación internacional’.” EFE, “‘España ha escogido la alianza, pero no el Vasallaje,’ dice ‘Le Monde,’” *Arriba*, September 29, 1953, 5.

territorial sovereignty was not so much misleading as mistaken. Yet, much of the rest of *Arriba's* arguments were predicated on blatant misrepresentations.

Contrary to the assertions made in *Arriba*, the Pact of Madrid was not, by any stretch of the imagination, even-handed. The structures of the agreements themselves were deeply unequal. As mentioned earlier, President Eisenhower knew that the Franco regime was unpopular with Democratic members of Congress and a full treaty would never be ratified. Moreover, contemporary public opinion polls showed that a significant portion of the North American electorate disapproved of the Franco regime. Instead, Eisenhower utilized executive agreements, which did not require congressional approval, and were far easier to dismantle. In this way, Eisenhower deftly skirted an open debate on collaboration with the Franco regime, which he would have most likely lost.

Had the Pact of Madrid been ratified as a treaty, the United States would have been bound to defend Spain in the event of Soviet aggression. However, as the mutual defense agreement was simply an executive agreement, the US was not truly committed to aiding the country in the event of an attack (made all the more likely by the positioning of bases and nuclear arms).

The terms of the Pact, further, demonstrate Spain's relative weakness during negotiations. The defense agreement, which allowed the creation of bases, was in force for "a period of ten years, automatically extended for two successive periods of five years each..." unless explicitly terminated by either government.⁵⁰ This was double the period of time laid out in similar base agreements in Greece, England and France. Moreover, the economic agreement only promised less than three years of aid, expiring on June 30, 1956, (although it did automatically renew every six months thereafter).⁵¹ Spain had entered into an unbalanced agreement, desperate for an influx of capital and military equipment and hopeful that it would lead to an international rehabilitation.

Thus, *Arriba's* coverage of the Pact of Madrid reveals more than just the administration's desire to convey an image of strength, stability, and legitimacy through international recognition and a Spanish-American partnership. The purposeful misrepresentation of the actual structure of the agreements also exposes that the regime was both cognizant of, and insecure about, appearing subservient to the United States. *Arriba* took great pains to demonstrate a (false)

⁵⁰ Department of State, "Defense Agreement," *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955; Basic Documents*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957). 1696-1698.

⁵¹ Department of State, "Economic Aid Agreement," *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955; Basic Documents*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957). 1696-1698.

distinction between the welfare like assistance that Western European nations received through the Marshall Plan from the *payment of compensation* provided for in the Pact. In reality, the Francoist state had effectively sold part of its territory and made the Iberian Peninsula a prime target in the event of nuclear war for an aid package very similar to the Marshall Plan. *Arriba's* attempt to portray Western European nations as jealous of the Pact and dependent on US handouts, only served to distract from the fact that Spain was no different. By misrepresenting the Pact of Madrid and the Spain–US relationship, *Arriba* presented an image of Spanish dominance, all the while hiding the deep political and economic weaknesses that had compelled the Spanish government to agree to a fundamentally unequal agreement.

“FRANCO Y LA GRAN POLITICA INTERNACIONAL”⁵²

Spain celebrated the *Día del Caudillo* on October 1st, 1953, just six days after the signing of the Pact of Madrid. The *Día del Caudillo* was a national holiday commemorating the anniversary of Franco becoming Head of State (*Jefe del Estado*) during the Civil War in 1936. *Arriba* marked the occasion by dedicating almost the entirety of that day's edition to stories about the Caudillo. The newspaper touted the accomplishment of the Pact of Madrid as evidence that Franco was the best and clearly legitimate leader of Spain. A full–page article entitled “Franco and the Grand International Policy” asserted that Franco was a keen diplomat, who deftly maneuvered on the international stage.⁵³ Thanks to Franco's leadership, Spain had weathered unjust international condemnation and was at the cusp of regaining the prestige it deserved as an anti-communist bastion. According to *Arriba*, The Pact of Madrid was the pinnacle of Franco's foreign policy successes. It was compensation for the regime's righteous ideological convictions, and would pave the way for inevitable United Nations membership.⁵⁴

Arriba credited Franco personally as the architect of the Pact from the first day of coverage. The September 27, 1953 edition of *Arriba* features a picture of General Franco prominently.⁵⁵ The newspaper credited the Franco government with securing favorable terms: “the terms of the convention were imposed by the

⁵² “Franco and the grand international policy” J. L. Gomez Tello, “Franco y la gran política internacional,” *Arriba*, October 1, 1953, 2.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* Spain was accepted into the United Nations in 1955 as part of a package deal to balance the inclusion of a number of Eastern European states under the Soviet sphere of influence. U.N. entry, however, was incorrectly touted as a direct result of the Pact of Madrid by all the domestic newspapers examined in the project. This is an area worthy of further investigation. Unfortunately, for lack of time and resources, it falls outside the scope of this project.

⁵⁵ *Arriba*, September 27, 1953.

Franco Government.”⁵⁶ *Arriba* selectively quoted from the foreign press to illustrate Franco’s positive and improving reputation abroad: US reporters said “the Caudillos’ prestige increases”, Belgium “praises Franco”, and the *Irish Times* reported that the agreements were the “greatest diplomatic triumph of the Caudillo.”⁵⁷

The cover of *Arriba*’s October 3rd, 1953 edition showed a picture of Franco waving superimposed over huge crowds celebrating *Día del Caudillo* in Madrid’s Plaza de Oriente.⁵⁸ The accompanying caption mentioned the Pact of Madrid as the first in a list of Franco’s accomplishments in 1953. This heavy-handed adulation linked Franco to the Pact for readers. The overtly positive spin on the accords presented by *Arriba* functioned not only to support Franco’s foreign policy agenda, but also to legitimize him domestically. Moreover, by extension it justified the continued existence of the Francoist state.

Arriba purposefully misrepresented the Pact and obfuscated the regime’s economic motivations, both by omission and commission. These falsehoods and omissions reveal Franco’s, and his governments, weaknesses and insecurities. Spain was suffering a prolonged economic depression and lacked any serious diplomatic clout. The unequal realities of the Pact, and *Arriba*’s attempt to hide them, expose the true shortcomings of Francoist state at the time of Spanish political re-emergence.

Readers of *ABC* and *La Vanguardia*, meanwhile, were presented with differing perspectives on the Pact of Madrid. These were the two most widely circulated Spanish newspapers in the early to mid-1950’s. Unlike *Arriba*, these newspapers were not mouthpieces of the regime, but were independently owned and operated. They were not, however, free from government oversight. Strict censorship ensured that these newspapers did not stray too far from the regime’s narrative. While these “independent” newspapers were barred from expressing any outright dissent, through subtle framing differences they promoted their own opinions.

⁵⁶ “...que los términos del convenio fueron impuestos por el Gobierno de Franco” Rodrigo Royo, “La firma del acuerdo, titulada a toda plana en la prensa norteamericana,” *Arriba*, September 27, 1953, 5.

⁵⁷ “Aumenta el prestigio del Caudillo” – “España ha escogido la alianza, pero no el Vasallaje,” dice ‘Le Monde,’” *Arriba*, September 29, 1953, 5: “Elogios a Franco” “El Kremlin ha acusado el golpe inferido al comunismo por el pacto hispanonorteamericano,” *Arriba*, September 29, 1953, 10: “El mayor triunfo diplomático del Caudillo” Ibid. 10.

⁵⁸ *Arriba*, October 3, 1953.

Press published within Spain at the time of the signing of the Pact of Madrid was subject to strict censorship. The Franco government exercised strict controls over the production and dissemination of all forms of media. “The Franco Regime established a closely knit censorship system to control all cultural activity in the country.”⁵⁹ Censorship ensured that media would promote a favorable image of the regime and present arguments in line with Franco’s ideology. Franco’s ideology, at least in public rhetoric, focused on a “return” to the cultural and social norms of traditional Spain that included anti-communism and a strict adherence to Catholicism.⁶⁰

Franco’s censorship apparatus had its origins in of the Spanish Civil War. On April 22, 1938, the Franco regime instituted the Press Law (*ley de prensa*).⁶¹ Philologist Raquel Merino describes the intent of this new law as legislation that “supported the establishment of a new heavily structured bureaucracy that would, like a gigantic whale, swallow up and subject to close scrutiny all cultural products meant for the public.”⁶²

This law eventually led to the creation of a massive state bureaucracy that practiced absolute control through *censura previa*: a censor read every word destined for print. Censorship was carried out by *juntas de censura*, groups composed of officials of both the state and Catholic Church under the auspices of the Ministry of Information and Tourism.⁶³ This decentralized censorship processes and rendered decisions opaque. “The criteria used by [the *juntas de censura*] had an aura of mystery...these unwritten and unknown criteria fell into four broad categories: sexual morality, political opinions, improper use of language, and religion.”⁶⁴ What was apparent was that the expression of political opposition to the Franco regime was prohibited.

The scope and intensity of censorship accounts for much of the similarity between content and ideas expressed in these newspapers. Clearly any open expression of disagreement or dissent would be censored and thus it was futile to attempt to publish it in commercially available newspapers.

⁵⁹ Daniel Gile, Gyde Hansen, and Nike K. Pokorn, *Why Translation Studies Matter* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 2010), 43.

⁶⁰ Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 386. .

⁶¹ Raquel Merino and Rosa Rabadán. “Censored Translations in Franco’s Spain: The TRACE Project Theatre and Fiction (English–Spanish). *TTR: Études sur le texte et ses transformations*, 15, no. 2 (2002), 25.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 126.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 125-130.

⁶⁴ Gile, Hansen, and Pokorn, *Why Translation*, 43.

Thus, press under the Franco dictatorship, as with many dictatorships, was not taken at face value. Readers were conditioned to read as much for what was *not* said as what actually was published. Journalists learned to circumvent the censors through subtle differences in framing and terminology, as well as conspicuous omissions. Consequently, the divergent presentations of the Pact of Madrid portrayed in these newspapers enable us to ascertain their distinct views, which departed from the regime narrative.

THE WRONG LEADER: *ABC* AND THE MONARCHISTS

ABC was a daily morning newspaper with an avowedly monarchist stance. During the Franco dictatorship, the newspaper enjoyed a reputation as relatively objective, largely due to its ideological differences with the predominately Falangist government. *ABC*'s reporting of the Pact of Madrid revolved around three central ideas: their strategic importance, the resulting international recognition, and the renewed Spanish–American relationship.

The newspaper's owners, and much of its readership, were avowed Alfonsist monarchists.⁶⁵ Monarchists, as previously detailed, were a crucial component of the only legal party, FET y de las JONS, created during the Spanish Civil War. Socially and politically conservative, monarchist supporters of the Nationalists were aligned in many respects with the fascists who originally defined the Franco dictatorship. *ABC* saw the Pact as a bulwark against potential expansion of Soviet Communism on the European continent by reinforcing the US security umbrella. Additionally, the Pact brought economic aid and international recognition that promised to solidify the conservative regime. Accordingly, the most widely read monarchist newspaper, *ABC*, presented a positive image of the Pact of Madrid. Its interpretation of the Pact was largely in agreement with the official party line conveyed through *Arriba*.

However, Franco himself was conspicuously absent from *ABC*'s coverage of the Pact of Madrid. While Franco adopted the mantle of a defender of the monarchy during the Civil War, he did not actually restore the Bourbon monarchy to the throne. Instead, he declared himself head of state and ruled Spain largely by decree. The monarchists agreed with much of the vision of Spain promoted by the Franco regime: socially conservative, deeply Catholic, and headed by a strong leader (*caudillo*). However, instead of Franco Alfonsists wanted a Bourbon monarch to be that leader. Consequently, even while *ABC* supported the Pact for

⁶⁵ Martin Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis in Spain, 1931–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 142.

many of the same reasons expressed in *Arriba*, it took great pains to avoid crediting Franco as the Pact's architect.

ABC: THE VOICE OF THE MONARCHISTS

On June 1, 1905, Torcuato Luca de Tena y Álvarez-Ossorio (henceforth Luca de Tena) founded *ABC* in Madrid under the auspices of his publishing house, *Prensa Española*.⁶⁶ The paper served as a forum for pro-monarchist thought and provided news about the royal family, then headed by King Alfonso XIII.⁶⁷ In 1928, the newspaper began publishing two separate editions; *ABC* in Madrid and *ABC de Sevilla* in the regional capital of Andalusia. With the start of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, the two editions of *ABC* found themselves on opposing sides of the conflict. *ABC* in Madrid was seized by the Republicans and began printing under the title, *ABC, Diario Republicano de Izquierdas*.

Meanwhile, *ABC de Sevilla* continued reporting from a monarchist perspective relatively undisturbed. At the end of the war, ownership of Madrid's *ABC* was returned to the Luca de Tena family, a reward for the family's allegiance to the Nationalist cause. The family consolidated the papers into a single edition (published simultaneously in Madrid and Seville and distributed nationally) in 1939.⁶⁸

The early 1950's were a particularly turbulent period in the history of *ABC*. The general climate in Spain was one of escalating tensions between Franco and the exiled Bourbon and Alfonsist heir to the throne, Juan de Borbón, and their respective supporters.⁶⁹ Broadly, the dispute over monarchic succession was a fight to define the character of the Franco regime; whether the fascist Falangists or the monarchists of the coalition party, the FET y de las JONS, would come to dominate the regime.⁷⁰

The newspaper itself became a focal point of this dispute. In 1952 Luca de Tena's grandson, Torcuato Luca de Tena y Brunet, was named director of

⁶⁶ Luca de Tena also founded the journal *Blanco y Negro* in 1891. Javier Fornieles Alcaraz, "Señor Ex Ministro, Novel de Torcuato Luca de Tena, y la estrategia de Alianza Popular durante la Transición," *Tonos digital: Revista electrónica de estudios filológicos*, no. 6 (2003), 1.

⁶⁷ Davara Torrego, "Los periódicos españoles," 137.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 138.

⁶⁹ The name "Juan de Borbón" is an abbreviation. His full title was don Juan Carlos Teresa Silvestre Alfonso de Borbón y Battenberg, Infante de España y Conde de Barcelona.

⁷⁰ The specifics and conclusion of this tension, however, fall outside the scope of this work. The succession dispute is detailed later in this text only as it pertains to the character of *ABC* and its positions.

ABC. Luca de Tena y Brunet's close ties to monarchist supporters soon "generated a permanent rivalry with the Falange and provoked constant confrontations with Arias-Salgado, Minister of Information when Torcuato Luca de Tena took, in 1952, charge of *ABC*."⁷¹ The newspaper was frequently targeted and censored by the Ministry of Information and Tourism — eleven times in 1952 alone — for infractions as minor as "using the denomination 'Head of State' instead of 'Caudillo.'"⁷² Luca de Tena y Brunet became a casualty of this dispute when he was removed from his role as director of *ABC* by Arias-Salgado later that same year.⁷³ *ABC*, in this period, is characterized by a sustained dedication to promoting a monarchist perspective in the face of the dwindling chances that their Alfonsist claimant would ever take the throne. It was in this divisive climate that *ABC* covered the 1953 signing of the Pact of Madrid.

"...LOS CONVENIOS QUE REFUERZAN LA PREPARACIÓN DEL OCCIDENTE EN EL MANTENIMIENTO DE LA PAZ"

ABC, and by extension its monarchist producers and readership, placed a tremendous value on the signing of the Pact of Madrid. The newspaper dedicated nearly six pages of its September 29th edition to printing the content of the three executive agreements that made up the Pact in their entirety.⁷⁴ This editorial choice, one similarly made by all the significant contemporary newspapers, clearly communicated that the Pact of Madrid was worthy of the nation's attention and recognition. *ABC* coupled this strong emphasis on the agreements with positive coverage of their content.

The first main argument promoted by *ABC* was that the Pact was of paramount strategic importance. This perspective is clear from the very beginning of coverage. *ABC*'s headline the day following the signing of the Pact, September 27, 1953, situated the Pact (and, by association, Spain) within a

⁷¹ "Muy pronto los vínculos con los sectores que apoyaban a don Juan de Borbón, generaron una permanente rivalidad con Falange y provocaron continuos enfrentamientos con Arias Salgado, el ministro de Información, cuando Torcuato Luca de Tena ocupó, en 1952, la dirección de *ABC*." Gabriel Arias-Salgado y de Cubas was a fascist leaning member of the FET y de las JONS. – Fornieles Alcaraz, "Señor Ex Ministro," 4.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Luca de Tena y Brunet regained his role as director in 1962, the same year as Arias-Salgado's death, and held the position until 1975. *Ibid.*, 5.

⁷⁴ "Texto literal de los convenios defensivo, de mutua defensa y ayuda económica, firmados por los Estados Unidos de América y España" "Texto Literal de los Convenios Defensivo, de Mutua Defensa y Ayuda Económica, firmados por los Estados Unidos de América y España," *ABC*, September 29, 1953, 33–38. This, as previously discussed, did not include the secret additional note to Article III of the defence agreement.

narrative of collective security: “The Governments of Spain and the United States Yesterday Signed Agreements that Strengthen the Preparation of the West in the Maintenance of Peace.”⁷⁵ This overblown praise revealed the tone of *ABC*’s reporting on the Pact itself; its achievement constituted nothing less than a substantial increase in the security of the “free” West in the midst of a Cold War climate.

The Pact was repeatedly portrayed as key to completing the burgeoning United States security umbrella. One article relays an anecdote wherein, five years prior, U.S. Senator Pat McCarran presented a map of Europe, with NATO countries shaded in, before the Senate.⁷⁶ McCarran, *ABC* claimed, pointed to Spain on the map and asserted that no western defense would be complete without “its strongest point and best base of action.”⁷⁷ This story sets the Pact up as the solution to a glaring hole in the defense strategy of the West against the Eastern Bloc.

Further articles explicitly outlined the value of the Pact. An article titled “The Meridional Flank of Europe, Protected” asserted that the Pact of Madrid shielded the West against any possible communist, specifically Soviet, aggression:

[the Pact] give[s] new protection to the meridional flank of Europe, reinforcing the defenses of the Mediterranean and the Middle East and facilitating alternate bases, from which bomber planes could launch counterattacks in critical zones far inside the interior of the Iron Curtain, in case of attack by the communists against the West.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ “Los gobiernos de España y los Estados Unidos firmaron ayer los convenios que refuerzan la preparación de occidente en el mantenimiento de la paz” *ABC*, September 27, 1953, 31.

⁷⁶ Senator Pat McCarran (D, NV) figured prominently among Franco’s U.S. supporters, often referred to as the “Spanish Lobby”. McCarran was also referred to as the Senator from Madrid. His reactionary position was not typical of his party. For a comprehensive history of the “Spanish Lobby” see Arturo Jarque Íñiguez, “*Queremos esas bases*”: *el acercamiento de Estados Unidos a la España de Franco* (Centro de Estudios Norteamericanos, Universidad de Alcalá, 1998).

⁷⁷ “Una vez, en el Senado norteamericano el senador McCarral [sic] hizo colocar en una pared del salón de sesiones un gran mapa de Europa...Pero el senador MacCarran [sic] señaló el espacio en blanco que quedaba en el extreme Oeste del mapa, precisamente en una zona crucial; dominando dos mares, el Mediterráneo y el Atlántico, y un zona montañosa de valor militar excepcional, los Pirineos. El gran blanco del mapa era España. Cuando el senador MacCarran [sic], que defendía entonces – hace cinco años – la alianza entre Estados Unidos y España, preguntó si podía tomarse en serio un sistema defensiva que ignoraba su punto más fuerte y su mejor base de acción, nadie supo que contestarle.” José María Massip, “ABC en Washington: Un gran avance en el planeamiento de la defensa de Europa,” *ABC*, September 27, 1953, 35.

⁷⁸ “...a reforzar más al mundo libre contra una posible agresión comunista. Dan más particularmente una nueva protección al flanco meridional de Europa, reforzando las defensas del

In this article, *ABC* detailed the potential for the military bases included in the Pact to fill the security gap identified by Senator McCarran. *ABC* asserted this overblown vision of the military importance of the Pact, and Spain by extension, in its most succinct and hyperbolic form on September 29th when relaying a statement by the pro-Franco U.S. Senator Richard R. Russell (D, GA): "...Spain is of tremendous importance for the defense of western Europe and the Pyrenees are the only line of defense against another invasion like D-Day in case of atomic war."⁷⁹

In no uncertain terms, *ABC* presented the Pact of Madrid as strategically invaluable to the defense of not only Spain, but all of the West, against the spread of an ideological foe, communism. In doing so, *ABC* presented a clearly hyperbolic image of Spain as a crucial lynchpin in the defense of the West, rather than just one cog in the NATO defense apparatus. From this argument, it is evident that Spanish monarchists, too, were pleased with the promise of the Pact to hinder any communist expansion and employed the Pact to their own patriotic ends.

Yet *ABC*, unlike *Arriba* and *La Vanguardia Española* (discussed next), did not present a purely optimistic view of the Pact of Madrid. Rather, *ABC* tempered its praise with hints of possible nuclear armament. The fact that the Pact permitted the United States to house nuclear warheads on the US bases within Spanish territory did not become common knowledge until the early 1960's.⁸⁰ The proliferation of nuclear weaponry, however, would not have been far from anyone's mind in late 1953; US technology was rapidly improving and the Soviet Union had tested its first thermonuclear device just one month earlier, on August 12, 1953.⁸¹

Mediterráneo y del Oriente Medio y facilitando bases alternativas, desde las cuales los bombarderos podrían lanzar contraataques a zonas críticas muy al interior del telón de acero, en caso de ataque de los comunistas a Occidente." "El flanco meridional de Europa, protegido," *ABC*, September 27, 1953, 36.

⁷⁹ "...España es de tremenda importancia para la defensa de la Europa occidental y que la línea de los pirineos es la única línea segura de defensa contra la necesidad de otra invasión como la de día 'D' en caso de una guerra con armas atómicas." "Stanton Griffis solo puede decir que ha rezado y trabajado por los acuerdos," *ABC*, September 29, 1953, 38.

⁸⁰ The full extent of the ability of the United States to launch a nuclear strike from Spanish territory, without prior permission, was not publicly known until 1977. See Ángel Viñas, *Los pactos secretos de Franco con Estados Unidos: bases, ayuda económica, recortes de soberanía* (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1981).

⁸¹ The Soviet Union announced that it had the ability to build a hydrogen bomb eight days later on August 20, 1953. *New York Times*, August 20, 1953.

On its first day of coverage, September 27, *ABC* opened with an article about atomic research on the European continent.⁸² While the article made no explicit reference to the Pact, its inclusion on that particular day suggested that the Pact could place Spain on the frontline in the atomic Cold War. Its appearance was not merely coincidental; no other article about atomic investigation or weaponry appeared in the week preceding or following the signing of the Pact of Madrid. Discussing atomic energy and weapons on the day that Spain entered into an agreement with the West's atomic superpower subtly hinted at some reservations from the Alfonsist camp.

It is likely that this apprehension explains why *ABC* framed its discussion of the Pact's strategic importance around their potential to ensure peace. While *Arriba* focused in on how it would strengthen Spain's military position, *ABC* instead took a more pacific tone. *ABC* couched its coverage in passive terminology rather than discussing the Pact's ability to enhance the West's, or particularly Spain's, military capabilities. Specifically, it repeatedly employed the word "peace" (*paz*). Ultimately, *ABC* and, by association, the Alfonsists appeared to have agreed with the official stance that the Pact was strategically important, but with some reservations not expressed by *Arriba*.

"PASO CONCRETO HACIA LA UNIDAD DE EUROPA"⁸³

In addition to their strategic value, *ABC* also alleged that the Pact of Madrid earned Spain a significant degree of international recognition and respect. This narrative is manifest from the first day of coverage. *ABC* referenced positive remarks made by the French military with regards to the Pact in the headlines of its edition of September 27th: "the French army – affirms Marshall Juin – finds itself satisfied with what has been done today."⁸⁴

That same day, *ABC* included an article claiming that news of the Pact had received an overwhelmingly positive reception earlier that day in France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and at the United Nations.⁸⁵ The newspaper continued with this argument in its following edition, on September 29th, including a banner

⁸² Miguel Masrera, "Ideario Atómico: Europa y la Investigación Atómica," *ABC*, September 27, 1953, 5.

⁸³ "Concrete Step Towards European Unity" – EFE, "Paso concreto hacia la unidad de Europa," *ABC*, September 29, 1953, 38.

⁸⁴ The cited French officer is Alphonse Pierre Juin. He attained the rank of Marshall of France in 1952 and was a NATO commander at the time of his remark. "...y el Ejército francés – afirma el mariscal Juin – se halla satisfecho por lo que se ha hecho ahora" – *ABC*, September 27, 1953, \ 31.

⁸⁵ "La firma de los convenios en el Extranjero," *ABC*, September 27, 1953, 33.

claiming “[t]he interest of the world is centered on the agreements formalized in Madrid.”⁸⁶ It further cited officials in Great Britain and Costa Rica to demonstrate widespread support.⁸⁷ *ABC* additionally quoted an anonymous NATO spokesperson: “The signing of the defense agreements between the United States and Spain will increase, without doubt, the general strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Zone....”⁸⁸ Taken together, these articles deliberately presented an image of Spain admired for its newest contribution to the West.

ABC’s representation of this international recognition focused heavily on France and Great Britain. The newspaper detailed examples of French appreciation in four articles on September 27th alone.⁸⁹ These articles tended to employ heavy-handed rhetoric; one banner read “New and important triumph of the Spanish government, they say in France.”⁹⁰ Another, under the headline “The French Army, Satisfied” asserted that, “French military officials are pleased to count a solid ally at their backs.”⁹¹ The British response was also described in glowing terms. The numerous inclusions of articles proclaiming widespread international support evidenced that the monarchist newspaper wanted to convey to its domestic audience a vision of a world, and specifically a Europe, overwhelmed with gratitude and support for the Spanish state. This tactic was mainly a response to the ostracism of Spain by the Western European nations.

Following the end of World War II in 1945, Spain was, in the eyes of many democratic nations, tainted by its previous support of the Axis. In Europe, Great Britain and France both openly opposed a *rapprochement* with Franco and his administration. In protest to the execution of a group of guerillas, including Cristino García (a Spanish veteran of the French Resistance), France indefinitely closed its Pyrenean border on March 1, 1946.⁹² The border remained closed until February 1, 1948.

⁸⁶ “El interés del mundo esta centrado en los acuerdos formalizados en Madrid,” *ABC*, September 29, 1953, 33.

⁸⁷ “Paso concreto hacia la unidad de Europa,” *ABC*, September 29, 1953, 38.

⁸⁸ “La firma de los acuerdos defensivos entre Estados Unidos y España aumentará, sin duda, la fuerza general de la zona del Tratado del Atlántico Norte, declara una portavoz de la N.A.T.O. en París.” – “Influencia en el Tratado Atlántico,” *ABC*, September 29, 1953, 38.

⁸⁹ *ABC*, September 27, 1953.

⁹⁰ “Nuevo e importante triunfo del gobierno español, se dice en Francia,” *ABC*, September 27, 1953, 37.

⁹¹ “Los militares franceses les agrada la idea de contar con un sólido aliado a sus espaldas...” – “El ejercito francés, satisfecho,” *ABC*, September 27, 1953, 37.

⁹² France had also briefly closed its border with Spain in June of 1945. Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 357.

In Britain, despite their ideological disagreements both Winston Churchill's Conservative Party and Clement Atlee's Labour Party understood that their respective supporters opposed open support of Franco at the Potsdam Conference. Neither party agreed on the best course of action during the Spanish Civil War but "[by] 1945, Franco's blatant approval of Hitler had made opposition on [the Spanish] question virtually impossible."⁹³

The United States realized that attempts at *rapprochement* could potentially alienate its principal European ally, Great Britain. In the middle of the Potsdam negotiations, the British people ousted Churchill in favor of Atlee, sparking fears amongst the U.S. negotiators that "a change in British policy towards Franco tougher than hitherto might show the United States in a bad light."⁹⁴

Worried about losing face with the British, acting US Secretary of State Joseph Grew openly contemplated releasing a letter critical of General Franco written by (then deceased) President Roosevelt. Although Grew never acted on these musings, the potential to use anti-Franco sentiments as a bargaining chip in negotiations illustrates how Western European nations wanted to publicly isolate the Franco regime from the very beginning of the post-war period. Thus, expressions of anti-Francoism in the immediate post-war offered the US potential leverage and greater credibility with its European allies.

This rhetorical shunning was given form when the United States, Great Britain and France published the *Tripartite Declaration* on March 4, 1946. The United States State Department announced this declaration with a press release titled, "The Spanish Government and the Axis."⁹⁵ The document stated that Franco's aid to the Axis powers during World War II disqualified his regime from relations with the Allied nations: "...so long as General Franco continues in control of Spain, the Spanish people cannot anticipate full and cordial association with those nations of the world which have, by common effort, brought defeat to German Nazism and Italian Fascism, which aided the present Spanish regime in its rise to power and after which the regime was patterned."⁹⁶ Thus, the three most powerful democratic nations of the Western Bloc openly condemned the

⁹³ Jill Edwards, *Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question in the Early Cold War, 1945-1955* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 48.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁹⁵ Department of State, "Relations with Spain: Statement by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, March 4, 1946," *A Decade of American Foreign Policy; Basic Documents, 1941-49*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 606.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

Franco regime. They expressly stated that they would not participate in “cordial” relations with Spain so long as Franco’s regime remained in place. Yet, the declaration simultaneously exposed the limits of this quarantine:

There is no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Spain. The Spanish people themselves must in the long run work out their own destiny...it is hoped that leading patriotic and liberal-minded Spaniards may soon find means to bring about a peaceful withdrawal of Franco, the abolition of the Falange, and the establishment of an interim or caretaker government under which the Spanish people may have an opportunity freely to determine the type of government they wish to have and to choose their leaders.⁹⁷

The United States, Great Britain and France signaled that the quarantine of the Franco regime would extend no further than mere rhetoric. There would be neither economic sanctions nor an active attempt to remove Franco from power. Instead, Spain would be rejected and treated as less than a full member of the international community. This was done in an attempt to punish both Franco and the Falange for their support of the Axis and potentially to destabilize the regime from within.

This type of public shunning was reinforced later that year when the United Nations formally denied Spain entry and mandated that all member states recall their ambassadors from Madrid. On February 9, 1946 the United Nations General Assembly passed its first resolution condemning the Franco regime. Resolution 32(I), *Relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain*, recommended that member states curtail relations with Spain as its government had come to power with the aid of the Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany.⁹⁸

Anti-Franco rhetoric at the United Nations escalated on December 12, 1946, with the passing of General Assembly Resolution 39(I), *Relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain*. The resolution passed by a vote of 34–6, with 13 abstentions.⁹⁹ The resolution began by reaffirming that Spain would not be admitted to the United Nations or any of its partner organizations so long as the Franco regime was in power: “The peoples of the United Nations, at San Francisco, Potsdam and London, condemn the Franco regime in Spain and decided that, as long as that regime remains, Spain may not be admitted to the

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Department of State, “UNGA Resolution 32 (I),” *A Decade of American Foreign Policy; Basic Documents, 1941-49*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950). 605.

⁹⁹ Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 358.

United Nations.”¹⁰⁰ It continued by asserting that Franco was not the legitimate representative of the Spanish people:

Convinced that the Franco Fascist Government of Spain, which was imposed by force upon the Spanish people with the aid of the Axis Powers and which gave material assistance to the Axis Powers in the war, does not represent the Spanish people, and by its continued control of Spain is making impossible the participation of the Spanish people with the peoples of the United Nations in international affairs; *Recommends* that the Franco Government of Spain be debarred from membership in international agencies established by or brought into relationship with the United Nations...until a new and acceptable government is formed in Spain.¹⁰¹

In this way, the United Nations further excluded Spain, barring it from participation in or with any UN sanctioned organizations. It continues, stating: “*Recommends* that all Members of the United Nations immediately recall from Madrid their Ambassadors and Ministers plenipotentiary accredited there.”¹⁰² Many nations had already cut diplomatic ties with Spain; the United States had withdrawn its Ambassador on November 20 of that same year.¹⁰³ Exclusion from the United Nations, the hallmark institution of the emerging post-war international system, sent a clear message of isolation and rejection to the Francoist state.

Yet, much like the *Tripartite Declaration*, these resolutions also evidenced the limits of anti-Franco sentiments. While they called on the UN Security Council to discuss measures to bring about a representative government in Spain, no plans ever came to fruition. Thus, condemnation of Spain remained decidedly passive: isolation and rhetorical shunning, but no active attempts to remove Franco from power.

The Pact of Madrid constituted an abandonment of the shunning policy practiced by the United States. The text of the executive agreement referred to the two countries, “developing their relations upon a basis of a continued friendship...”¹⁰⁴ For the first time in the regime’s history, it had documented and written proof of friendly relations with the United States.

¹⁰⁰ Department of State, “UNGA Resolution 39 (I),” *A Decade of American Foreign Policy; Basic Documents, 1941-49*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950). 605.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 356.

¹⁰⁴ Department of State, “Defense Agreement,” *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955; Basic Documents*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957). 1696-1698.

ABC took full advantage of this development, employing the Pact as evidence of an end to Spain's exclusion from the international community. An article from *ABC*'s correspondent in Washington, D.C. explained how the Pact was meant to put an end to the "diplomatic ostracism that the United Nations had subjected Spain to since 1946" and to "return Spain to Europe, to its reality."¹⁰⁵ Whatever their disagreements with Franco and his regime, the monarchists clearly shared a desire to end the political shunning of Spain.

Yet, this framing also reveals a major point of divergence from the party line. *Arriba* demonstrated international, and specifically European, acclaim in order to distance itself from Europe. The Francoist state desperately did not want to be associated with the kind of aid it felt the United States bestowed on France and Great Britain, for fear of appearing subservient and weak. *Arriba* positioned the aid provisions of the Pact in stark contrast to similar aid to other European nations, suggesting that the Pact was really a type of compensation for Spain's ardent anti-communist stance. Meanwhile, *ABC* framed the Pact in terms of its potential to re-integrate Spain into Europe. Instead of demonstrating power by contrasting Spain to the rest of Europe, *ABC* argued that a proverbial "seat at the table" was a positive development.

ABC and its monarchist audience wanted to see Spain receive the respect on the international stage that they fervently believed it deserved. However, unlike *Arriba*, *ABC* saw a renewed place in the community of nations and a shift back towards European acceptance as the endgame. The Pact of Madrid, as the vehicle of this recognition, therefore deserved to be praised.

Remarkably, *ABC* makes almost no mention of opposition to the signing of the Pact of Madrid. Dissent is only recognized in a single line from one article on the 27th: "However, [a spokesperson from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs] warned that there would be large 'screams' from leftist groups [within France]."¹⁰⁶ Noticeably absent was any coverage of remarks from left-leaning groups or governments in Europe, or any objections from Moscow. Omission of the backlash to the Pact, at first glance, may have simply been a tactic to reinforce the positive image portrayed by *ABC*.

¹⁰⁵ "El Tratado da, al mismo tiempo, la medida del camino recorrido en el mundo desde los días de Potsdam y del ostracismo diplomático a que las Naciones Unidas sometieron a España en 1946. Con el Tratado hispanoamericano se ha puesto fin hoy a una ficción y se ha devuelto a Europa, a su realidad." – José María Massip, "ABC en Washington: Un gran avance en el planeamiento de la defensa de Europa," *ABC*, September 27, 1953, 35.

¹⁰⁶ "Sin embargo, advirtió que habrá grandes 'gritos' por parte de los grupos izquierdistas." "La firma de los convenios en el Extranjero," *ABC*, September 27, 1953, 33.

This omission, however, was a conscious choice. Relaying any meaningful negative reception in European nations would have diminished *ABC*'s argument that Spain had rejoined Europe. Ignoring Soviet indignation, moreover, directly related to how the monarchists perceived their place within the regime's governing hierarchy. Franco styled himself as the "Sentinel of the West," fighting against the influence and expansion of communism. Had the signing of the Pact not incited outrage in Moscow, the Pact themselves could have easily been discounted as inconsequential. Underlining this outrage served to illustrate their value to the defense of Spain, understood as any hindrance to potential "communist aggression" and bolstered Franco's anti-communist credentials. Simply, the Francoist government, and Franco himself, drew legitimacy from their own self-proclaimed role as a counterbalance to the Soviets. *Arriba* clearly promoted this narrative through its inclusion of Soviet backlash to the signing of the Pact.

The monarchists, by contrast, did not share this outlook. First, omitting the Soviet reaction was principally a way to stop their praise of the Pact from bolstering Franco's legitimacy, whose position as leader the monarchists vehemently opposed. Second, it demonstrated that the Alfonsists saw themselves as outside of the regime's hierarchy. As monarchists did not believe themselves fairly represented in the national governance structure, they had little to gain from promoting a version of events that gave undue credit to the regime.

Ultimately, *ABC* made repeated reference to international recognition of Spain, as a national entity, that resulted from the Pact. *ABC* illustrated the monarchists' nationalist leanings. They maintained a strong desire to see Spain resume its rightful place among nations and in Europe. However, the newspaper took great pains to avoid bestowing any of the credit for international recognition on the Franco regime, which monarchists held was morally just, but led by an illegitimate leader.

"LOS GOBIERNOS DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS Y ESPAÑA DESEAN CONTRIBUIR AL MANTENIMIENTO DE LA PAZ"¹⁰⁷

Stanton Griffis was purportedly asked to comment on the Pact of Madrid on September 28, two days after its signing. Griffis, the former U.S. ambassador to Spain, was instrumental in the initial negotiations. He maintained that, as he was no longer an agent of the state, he could not make an official comment.

¹⁰⁷ "Los gobiernos de los Estados Unidos y España desean contribuir al mantenimiento de la paz," *ABC*, September 27, 1953, 32.

Griffis added, however, that he had “...prayed and worked for these agreements...”¹⁰⁸ With this unassuming story, *ABC* expertly implied a sense of closeness between the United States and Spain, strengthened through mutual religiosity. This story encapsulates *ABC*’s argument about relations with the United States: the Pact of Madrid evidenced not only a renewed Spanish–American relationship, but also one based on equality and mutual respect.

ABC promoted the Pact to prove a *rapprochement* with the United States. In addition to acknowledgments of Spain’s political shunning by European nations, *ABC* specifically detailed how the Franco regime had not enjoyed full diplomatic relations with the United States. The newspaper asserted that, as a result of the shunning that had “imposed Spain’s absence from the UN and NATO,” the Franco regime had only been capable of signing small and limited bilateral agreements with the US.¹⁰⁹ Importantly, *ABC* took care not to blame the United States for this shunning, leaving the door open for its later assertion that *rapprochement* was popular with and sought after by the American public. The article set the stage for illustrating Spanish–American *rapprochement*; by showing the lack of previous treaties and agreements, the Pact of Madrid was all the more groundbreaking.

ABC drove home the notion of *rapprochement* by including a message from the Spanish ambassador to the United States, José Felix de Lequerica. De Lequerica asserted that, over the preceding five and a half years, popular opinion in the US towards Spain had radically shifted. The “moral rectitude of the North American people [had] prevailed” over “a campaign of confusion” instigated by communists and their sympathizers.¹¹⁰ *ABC* used the ambassador’s message principally to evidence Spain’s recent *rapprochement* with the US, both a cause and effect of the Pact of Madrid. This use also subtly hinted at Spanish moral superiority. The US public had overcome communist propaganda and come around to the right path, *Spain’s* path. In this light, the monarchist perspective was that the Pact of Madrid had led to Spanish–American *rapprochement* and that this renewed relationship was further evidence of the moral legitimacy of a strictly conservative Spain. Here, the monarchists mostly closely aligned with the

¹⁰⁸ “He rezado y trabajado por esos acuerdos, pero no puedo decir más.” “Stanton Griffis solo puede decir que ha rezado y trabajado por los acuerdos,” *ABC*, September 29, 1953, 38.

¹⁰⁹ “...imponiendo su ausencia de la O.N.U. y de la N.A.T.O.” – “Acuerdos y Convenios firmados anteriormente por España y los Estados Unidos,” *ABC*, September 27, 1953, 34.

¹¹⁰ “Pero, a la vez, una campaña de confusión fue creada aquí, como en otras partes, por el propio comunismo...La rectitud moral y la inteligencia política del pueblo norteamericano han prevalecido.” “Una nueva nación en la defensa del Continente,” *ABC*, September 27, 1953, 35–36.

regime perspective about the moral rectitude of a conservative nation and Spain's role and responsibility in the fight against communism.

ABC further utilized the Pact as evidence of equality in the Spanish–American relationship. The language used to describe the Pact was couched in terms that denote equality, such as the term “jointly” (*conjuntamente*).¹¹¹ One article titled, “Each Government Makes Available to the Other Necessary Equipment, Material and Services” subtly — and incorrectly — suggested that the Pact would afford equal utility to both nations.¹¹²

This assertion, as previously discussed, was patently false. The very design of the Pact, three executive agreements as opposed to a full treaty, placed far greater responsibilities and risks on the Spanish government. Moreover, the ten year duration of the defense agreement was unusually long and onerous. Yet, *ABC* chose to gloss over these details, instead fabricating a view of Spain and the United States as being on a level playing field. This assertion revealed the monarchist desire to legitimize and strengthen the notion of a conservative Spain. By arguing equality with the United States, the West's superpower, *ABC* implied that Spain was, by association, similarly powerful and influential.

Doubling down on its erroneous assertion of equality with the United States, *ABC* even went so far as to suggest that Spain actually had the upper hand in negotiations. The newspaper repeatedly mentioned the belief that US bases in Spain would, ultimately, remain under Spanish territorial sovereignty and control.¹¹³ The provision affording control over land leased to, and used by, the US armed forces was presented as a significant diplomatic coup, itself evidence of Spain's relative strength. A September 29th article relayed that those in the “London diplomatic circles” were impressed by the Pact “as much for what they omit as for what they contain.”¹¹⁴ The “omitted” content this quote refers to is any clause giving the United States *de facto* sovereignty over their bases and personnel abroad, which was characteristic of nearly all of their similar base agreements in Portugal, Greece, and Turkey.

¹¹¹ “Los gobiernos de los Estados Unidos y España desean contribuir al mantenimiento de la paz,” *ABC*, September 27, 1953, 32.

¹¹² “Cada gobierno pone a disposición del otro el equipo, material y servicios necesarios,” *ABC*, September 27, 1953, 32.

¹¹³ The secret note that, in effect, voided this promise was not made public until 1977. Therefore, this assertion by *ABC* was not so much deceptive as misguided.

¹¹⁴ “En general, en los círculos diplomáticos de Londres se da el parabién a los acuerdos, tanto por lo que omiten como por lo que contienen...” “En los círculos diplomáticos ingleses,” *ABC*, September 29, 1953, 38.

ABC stressed this angle in order to present a hyperbolic account of Spanish political power, not just in negotiations with the United States, but also in relation to other Mediterranean nations engaged in similar base agreements. Ultimately, this revealed the monarchists' profoundly rooted nationalist agenda: to use the Pact to inflate their nation's power, both regionally and internationally.

FRANCO'S CONSPICUOUS ABSENCE

ABC's hyperbolic and congratulatory coverage of the Pact of Madrid took great pains to avoid giving any credit to Franco himself. Unlike the other newspapers examined, *ABC*'s cover page on the first day of coverage, September 27, did not figure Franco prominently, or even at all. Instead, *ABC* opened with a pastoral scene of a peasant walking between a river and a church, ostensibly on the Castilian planes.¹¹⁵

While the photo itself is innocuous, the juxtaposition it created on any newsstand the morning of the 27th would have been jarring. Every other newspaper personally credited the Caudillo with the most important diplomatic event in the Franco regime's history, except the mouthpiece of the monarchists. This exclusion blatantly revealed that monarchists were deeply conflicted by the Pact of Madrid. The content of the Pact itself went hand in hand with their conservative social ideology. Yet, at the same time, it gave greater power and legitimacy to the wrong leader. Excluding General Franco from both the cover and all subsequent coverage was an attempt by *ABC* to straddle the line between praising the content and intent of the Pact and subtly condemning their architect.

The signing of the Pact was a critical popularity boost for Franco and was accordingly used to shore up his credibility domestically and abroad. Franco's increasing legitimacy was a direct blow to the monarchists' hope of installing don Juan de Borbón as king. The signing, moreover, came at the tail end of a series of public defeats of don Juan de Borbón at the hands of the Francoist government. Specifically, in 1947 at the advice of Luis Carrero Blanco, the Minister of the Presidency, the Spanish government decided to formally change the laws of monarchic succession and allow Franco to name his own royal successor.¹¹⁶ In response, don Juan published his April 27, 1947 "Estoril Manifesto" which denounced the proposed changes as illegal: "Franco, Martín Artajo [Minister of Foreign Affairs], and Carrero Blanco agreed that don Juan had thereby eliminated

¹¹⁵ *ABC*, September 27, 1953.

¹¹⁶ Paul Preston, *Juan Carlos: Steering Spain from Dictatorship to Democracy* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 37. The Ministry of the Presidency is responsible for handling relations between the Prime Minister (*Presidente del Gobierno de España*) and other ministries.

himself as a suitable successor to the Caudillo.”¹¹⁷ Days later, Don Juan published declarations stating that he

was prepared to reach an agreement with Franco only if it was limited to the details of the peaceful and unconditional transfer of power. Since don Juan had declared himself in favour of a democratic monarchy, the legalization of political parties and trade unions, a degree of regional decentralization, religious freedom and even a partial amnesty, Franco was livid...[Franco] unleashed a furious press campaign against don Juan....¹¹⁸

Neither the protests of Don Juan, nor of his advisors and sympathizers were sufficient to block the reformed *Ley de Sucesión*, which was “rubber-stamped by the Cortes in June and endorsed by a carefully choreographed referendum on 6 July 1947.”¹¹⁹ This new law, and Don Juan’s very public defeat, severely weakened the monarchist position in Spain. Monarchists feared that this diplomatic feat would be the final nail in the coffin of Don Juan’s chances of ever taking the throne, explaining the great pains they took to avoid bestowing Franco with any praise and, by extension, legitimacy.

Yet *ABC* did not simply omit any and all references to General Franco. Rather, the newspaper subtly implied that Franco’s role was solely ceremonial, and therefore, inconsequential. The main story in *ABC*’s September 29 edition was, of course, the signing of the Pact. Again, Franco was not mentioned in relation to the Pact. The newspaper’s front page and a subsequent article in the newspaper, however, detailed what Franco had personally been doing during the signing of the Pact; accepting the credentials of the ambassadors of Venezuela and Greece to Spain.¹²⁰ This created a sharp contrast in the newspaper between what it stressed as important news as opposed to how Franco occupied himself. Thus, Franco was shown as an empty figurehead, carrying out routine and ceremonial tasks while others undertook the real work of governing.

All told, *ABC*’s coverage of the Pact is defined by contrast. The monarchist newspaper repeatedly praised the Pact, illustrating their ideological affinity, with reservations, to its content. Meanwhile, *ABC*’s treatment of Franco revealed deep-seated insecurities about the position of their ideal leader, don Juan, and pervasive doubts as to Franco’s legitimacy. From the monarchist

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 38. Called the “Estoril Manifesto” for the town in Portugal where Don Juan was living at the time.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 38–39.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 39.

¹²⁰ *ABC*, September 29, 1953.

perspective, the Pact itself was a significant accomplishment, but, they feared, a double-edged sword that would weaken their cause.

The Alfonsist's measured support for the Pact, and rejection of Franco, was driven by ideology. The readers of *La Vanguardia Española*, however, placed profit over ideology. Their outright support was payment for economic aid and incentive.

MATERIAL INCENTIVES: *LA VANGUARDIA ESPAÑOLA* AND BUSINESS

La Vanguardia Española (henceforth *La Vanguardia*) is a conservative, business-orientated, newspaper published in Barcelona and distributed nationally. At the time of Spanish re-emergence the readership of *La Vanguardia*'s was primarily businessmen.¹²¹ The newspaper was written by and for Spaniards concerned with commerce and business, and was not as dominated by partisan rhetoric as *Arriba*. Consequently, the newspaper framed the Pact of Madrid through its potential to improve the Spanish economy. Coverage of the Pact of Madrid by *La Vanguardia* focused on four major themes: its strategic value in the fight against communism; the ensuing international recognition; Spain's connection to the United States; and, Franco's personal role in their achievement.

Fascism's pro-business ideology was in competition with numerous belief systems, especially a nostalgic rural monarchism. Franco himself seemingly favored this nostalgia for Spain's agricultural past over support for a more stereotypically fascist platform of modernization and industrialization.¹²² The Franco government's autarkic economic policies, further, severely handicapped economic recovery in the fourteen years since the close of the Spanish Civil War. Business-oriented Spaniards, thusly, had reason to doubt that Spain would become an environment conducive to their financial interests.

La Vanguardia interpreted the Pact as a major opportunity to improve Spain's—and its readers'—economic conditions. The Pact promised significant economic aid in return for permission to establish U.S. Air Force bases at

¹²¹ The use of the terms "businessman" and "business" are neither comprehensive definitions of the Spanish business class nor should they be assumed to be encompassing of all non-working class Spaniards.

¹²² Crucially, there was a stark difference between the official discourse of the regime and the policies it actually pursued. Franco publicly advocated a traditionalist, rural model for Spain. The state under his leadership, however, aggressively pursued policies of industrialization and modernization, more in line with fascist ideology.

Torrejón, Zaragoza and Morón de la Frontera and a naval base at the port of Rota. This, in turn, would provide Spanish businesses with lines of credit and the ability to more fully participate in the Bretton–Woods economic system. Accordingly, *La Vanguardia* presented a triumphal, optimistic view of the Pact of Madrid, framed through a uniquely commercial lens. The Pact was beneficial because it would provide much–needed economic stimulation. Moreover, Franco deserved praise by virtue of achieving it.

LA VANGUARDIA: PROFIT OVER PRINCIPLE

La Vanguardia was first published on December 31, 1887 under the ownership of the conde de Godó.¹²³ Unlike most of Barcelona’s newspapers, *La Vanguardia* was not shuttered when Nationalist forces entered Barcelona in 1939. Instead, ownership of the newspaper was restored to the Godó family, and the victorious Nationalists permitted to continue under two conditions. First, the newspaper would add the word *Española* to the title so as to make it more Castilian. This new title ensured the newspaper avoided the “threat of appearing regionalist” and that it would not support Catalan regionalism.¹²⁴ Second, the Franco regime would choose the newspaper’s director. Ramón Serrano Súñer, the Minister of the Interior (who was simultaneously the president of the *Junta Política* and Franco’s own brother–in–law), appointed Luis de Galinsoga, a conservative Carlist, as director.¹²⁵ Despite Galinsoga’s personal political views, *La Vanguardia* did not advocate the restoration of the monarchy. Rather, it focused instead on news as it pertained to the economy.

“PASO DECISIVO EN LA DEFENSA DEL MUNDO LIBRE”¹²⁶

One of *La Vanguardia*’s main depictions of the Pact of Madrid was that it was crucial to the defense of the West and, by extension, the fight against communism. This narrative was evident from the start. The September 27, 1953 edition of *La Vanguardia* opened with a headline proclaiming that the U.S. and Spain had reached an agreement for “the maintenance of peace and international security.”¹²⁷ Another article later in that same edition began with a quote from the

¹²³ The newspaper was first published in 1881 as an organ of a short–lived political party. It became a (ostensibly) non–partisan newspaper in 1887. Davara Torrego, “Los periódicos españoles,” 142.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ “Ministro de la Gobernación de España” Ibid.

¹²⁶ “Decisive step in the defense of the free world.” Augusto Assia, “El acontecimiento más importante de los últimos años,” *La Vanguardia Española*, September 27, 1953.

¹²⁷ “Acuerdo de España y Estados Unidos para el mantenimiento de la paz y de la seguridad internacional,” *La Vanguardia Española*, September 27, 1953.

Spanish Ambassador in Washington, José Félix de Lequerica, proclaiming the signing to be the “most important event in recent years.”¹²⁸ The article further claimed that an unnamed American spokesperson had referred to the Pact as key to winning the fight for “liberty against communism.”¹²⁹ A key argument emerged the day after the signing: The Pact of Madrid had led to Spanish harmonization with Western defense, orchestrated by the United States, and therefore Spain was a bulwark against communism.

These arguments were better elucidated in later coverage. *La Vanguardia* continuously described the Pact as crucial to the defense of Spain, Europe, and the West in general.¹³⁰ The newspaper frequently employed the term harmony (*armonía*) to describe the impact of the Pact. One article published on September 29, 1953 called the Pact a “positive contribution to European harmony.”¹³¹ The promotion of the idea of harmony presented an optimistic and welcoming view of the agreements: “[The Pact of Madrid] incorporated Spain geographically in the military network of the Strategic Air Command and established a significant American military presence [in Spain] for the next two decades.”¹³² Ultimately, the repeated use of optimistic terms reinforced the positive presentation of the Pact.

Further, discussion of the Pact was couched in terms of how it would act as a deterrent to communist expansion, particularly by the Soviet Union. One sub-header from September 29th implied that the minimal reaction by the Soviet Union to the signing evidenced how frightened they were by the Pact.¹³³ Another article asserted that the agreements constituted a major blow to communist hope of expansion on the continent.¹³⁴ This particular framing mirrored that of *Arriba* and *ABC*. All of the newspapers reflected, through these arguments, the “official interpretation” of the Pact of Madrid as a valiant effort in the fight against Spain’s principal ideological enemy, communism.¹³⁵ This editorial treatment was not purely a result of the ideological control by the regime. Rather, businessmen in fact strongly opposed the spread of communism, knowing that the ideology was a threat to their own wealth and power.

¹²⁸ Assia, “El acontecimiento.”

¹²⁹ “...la clave de la lucha por la libertad contra el comunismo” Ibid.

¹³⁰ “Hombro con Hombro,” *La Vanguardia Española*, September 29, 1953.

¹³¹ Assia, “El acontecimiento.”

¹³² Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 418.

¹³³ EFE, “Algunas retencencias, ya descontadas, no modifican el cuadro de congratulación universal,” *La Vanguardia Española*, September 29, 1953.

¹³⁴ Assia, “El acontecimiento.”

¹³⁵ Viñas, *En las garras*, 204.

Therefore, this presentation revealed strong ties between the regime and business-oriented citizens. Capitalist-minded Spaniards in this period were diametrically opposed to Soviet expansion on an ideological and practical level as it threatened their material wealth. Whether for a true believer in the Francoist state or just a shrewd businessman, a defense against communism was favorable.

“REPERCUSIÓN MUNDIAL FAVORABLE”

La Vanguardia further asserted that the Pact of Madrid brought widespread international recognition and acclaim. For every article describing the agreements themselves, *La Vanguardia* included another describing their reception in different parts of the world.¹³⁶ On September 27th, 1953, for example, *La Vanguardia* dedicated three fourths of a page to a discussion of international reception. One article, ““Repercusión Mundial Favorable,” outlined the positive reception in Great Britain, France, the United States, and the United Nations of the announcement of the signing of the Pact.

In British military and diplomatic circles, the newspaper claimed, the signing of the Pact piqued considerable interest.¹³⁷ Moreover, British diplomats were reported as saying that the Pact would be equally beneficial for Spain and the United States, and they were indirectly valuable in the defense of Western Europe.¹³⁸ The newspaper downplayed the reaction in France, asserting that, while leftist newspapers opined against the Pact, they had not done so excessively. Furthermore, it reported that French military officials appreciated the indirect help Spain would now constitute in the defense structure of NATO and voiced their satisfaction that they could soon count Spain as an ally. *La Vanguardia* conveyed that Lord Hastings Ismay, Secretary General of the UN, had welcomed the signing of the Pact of Madrid, claiming it would complement NATO defenses.¹³⁹ Overall, through its achievement of the Pact of Madrid, *La Vanguardia* presented to its readers the portrait of a Spain respected for its contributions to its fellow Western nations.

La Vanguardia continued in this same vein in following days. For example, the September 29th, 1953 edition dedicated an entire page to articles

¹³⁶ See Appendix II for figures on relative coverage of the Pact of Madrid between newspapers.

¹³⁷ “Repercusión mundial favorable,” *La Vanguardia Española*, September 27, 1953.

¹³⁸ “La firma del Pacto hispano-norteamericano ha sido recibida en los círculos diplomáticos y militares con considerable interés... Los círculos diplomáticos han considerado el citado Acuerdo como un éxito en la diplomacia española y creen que sus resultados serán beneficiosos tanto para España como para los EE.UU. e indirectamente a la larga, de la defensa de la Europa occidental”
Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

pertaining to international reception under the banner “The Convention Through our Foreign Correspondents.”¹⁴⁰ Again, articles from correspondents in New York, London and Paris promoted a general image of international acclaim. The *La Vanguardia* article regarding French reception alleged that the response in Paris had been one of grudging respect. Apart from indignation in left-leaning newspapers, *La Vanguardia* painted the French as impressed that Spain had achieved such a crucial agreement and accepting of its necessity.¹⁴¹ The article “Diplomatic and Strategic Victory” asserted that, in London, everyone appreciated the magnitude of the agreements for their contribution to the defense of the West. Furthermore, *La Vanguardia* contended that the English were impressed that, according to the Pact, Spain would maintain sovereignty over territory used by the United States’ armed forces, which no other nation in which bases were situated had achieved.¹⁴²

The September 29, 1953 newspaper also contained another article that listed reactions, overwhelmingly positive, from nineteen different countries, including the Holy See.¹⁴³ On October 3, *La Vanguardia* ran an article stating that conservative press in Great Britain had remarked on the error of the Labour government with respect to Spain. The article reported that the *Daily Telegraph* (a conservative British newspaper) chastised the socialist government for not recognizing the value of the Pact and for vainly hoping that Franco’s government would fall.¹⁴⁴ These reports presented an image of growing respect from European nations and condemnation of those who continued to oppose Franco’s government.

¹⁴⁰ “Los acuerdos por nuestros corresponsales en el extranjero,” *La Vanguardia Española*, September 29, 1953.

¹⁴¹ Antonio Martínez Tomas, “Ni satélites ni vasallos, se comenta en París,” *La Vanguardia Española*, September 29, 1953.

¹⁴² “...todos aprecian en el Tratado dos notas especiales; su importancia estratégica y diplomática y el haber salvado la soberanía nacional hasta un punto que ninguna otra nación había conseguido hasta ahora.” Rafael de Luis, “Victoria diplomática y estratégica,” *La Vanguardia Española*, September 29, 1953.

¹⁴³ EFE, “Algunas reticencias, ya descontadas, no modifican el cuadro de congratulación universal,” *La Vanguardia Española*, September 29, 1953.

¹⁴⁴ “No son los Estados Unidos los que están prestando ayuda al Generalísimo Franco dice [the *Daily Telegraph*] — sino que es éste quien está ayudando a la alianza democrática y, al cerrar una brecha estratégica de nuestras defensas, ayuda enormemente al mundo libre. Suponiendo que se produjera una situación de gravedad, ¿serían los socialistas los que rechazarán la ayuda de España? Durante ocho años los laboristas ingleses han estado esperando la caída del régimen español, pero una conjura ofensiva para el orgullo español no ha hecho más que reforzarle.” EFE, “La Prensa conservadora británica reconoce el error de su Gobierno con respecto a España,” *La Vanguardia Española*, October 3, 1953.

These reports, taken together, illustrate how *La Vanguardia* conveyed to its domestic audience that foreign nations, namely the Western European powers of France and the United Kingdom, were impressed by, and grateful for, the Pact of Madrid. As explored in the previous chapter, this desire to demonstrate international recognition was largely a reaction to the Western European nations' isolation of Spain since 1939.

Seen in context of that period of ostracism, *La Vanguardia's* constant reinforcement of the idea of international recognition, especially in London and Paris, takes on new significance. By including these articles, the newspaper implicitly argued that this period had ended. Therefore the Pact of Madrid was not just an important development in Western security, but also a turning point for the nation. From that point forward, Spain would have the respect it deserved and was on its way to resuming its rightful place in the community of nations.

Nevertheless, not all of the foreign response was so rosy according to *La Vanguardia*. *La Vanguardia* relayed leftist indignation that was voiced following the signing of the Pact of Madrid as a means of reinforcing their value. The newspaper described the "international communist" response to the Pact as "rabid."¹⁴⁵ It also noted objections from, among others, the *Socialist Party of France* and the purportedly socialist-leaning British newspaper, *Daily Express*, under the banner "The Socialist Attitude."¹⁴⁶ The Pact was meant to complement the growing US security umbrella, explicitly built to "contain" the spread of communism. Left wing backlash, especially from communists, underscored the importance of the Pact, which otherwise might have been discounted as inconsequential. Instead, the presentation of the left wing reaction highlighted how meaningful *La Vanguardia* and its business audience believed the Pact to be.

Here, *La Vanguardia* and *ABC's* coverage are noticeably distinct. *La Vanguardia* readily acknowledged the Pact's international detractors, employing their dissent as evidence of the importance of Franco's Spain in the fight against communism. This argument played directly into the regime's self-narrative, with Franco as the "Sentinel of the West." *ABC*, by contrast, omitted any reference to condemnation in a subtle attempt to avoid giving an air of prestige to Franco's leadership. In this instance, *La Vanguardia* revealed a remarkably pro-regime perspective by aligning itself so heavily with the government's narrative.

¹⁴⁵ "...a la reacción rabiosa del comunismo internacional" Cristóbal Tamayo, "La figura de España se agiganta," *La Vanguardia Española*, September 29, 1953.

¹⁴⁶ "La actitud del socialismo" - EFE, "La Prensa conservadora."

Ultimately, the overall tone of *La Vanguardia*'s coverage of the Pact of Madrid was optimistic. *La Vanguardia* introduced the idea of international recognition as evidence that Spain was finally escaping from the political shunning characteristic of the post-war period. Even the front cover of *La Vanguardia* on the first day of coverage pushed this narrative. Above pictures of Franco, Eisenhower, and the signing ceremony reads the headline, "A Historic Day for the West".¹⁴⁷ This cover succinctly presented the Pact as a turning point for relations with the Western Bloc. Yet, the inclusion of photos of Franco and Eisenhower underscores the development on which *La Vanguardia* (much like *Arriba*) placed the most weight; the reemergence of Spanish-American relations. *Rapprochement* with the US, it asserted, was the key to desired economic growth.

"ACUERDO DE ESPAÑA Y ESTADOS UNIDOS"¹⁴⁸

La Vanguardia's reporting on the Pact of Madrid centered, above all else, on Spanish-American relations. Throughout its coverage, the newspaper used the Pact to demonstrate that the United States and Spain were working together, as equals. By representing Spain as an equal party in negotiations with the West's predominant superpower, *La Vanguardia* bestowed upon the Franco regime far more power and prestige than it actually had. The economic framing employed by *La Vanguardia* was a furtherance of a practice to enhance the prestige of the regime. *La Vanguardia*'s framing was to make it self-evident to its readers that the Pact not only proved a *rapprochement* with the United States, but to further assert that would lead to economic growth.

To enhance the demonstration of the *rapprochement* used its New York correspondent Felipe Fernández Armesto (under the pseudonym Augusto Assía). On September 27th he wrote that, after a century and a half of cold relations, the reestablishment of meaningful ties between the two countries had left him personally overcome with emotion.¹⁴⁹ He followed this this up with an article informing readers that the Waldorf Astoria and Plaza hotels used the Francoist version of the Spanish flag for the first time.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ "Un día histórico para occidente" *La Vanguardia Española*, September 27, 1953.

¹⁴⁸ "Acuerdo de España y Estados Unidos para el mantenimiento de la paz y de la seguridad internacional," *La Vanguardia Española*, September 27, 1953.

¹⁴⁹ "Tras siglo y medio de desgana e incuria, España y los Estados Unidos volvieron a encontrarse y a firmar un Pacto. ¿Que mucho que a un corresponsal español telegrafando desde el salón de noticias de la United Press en un rascacielos de Nueva York se le antoje imaginarse esta tarde estar asistiendo a la segunda salida de España al mundo y no pueda evitar que un soplo de emoción agite sus últimas palabras?" Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Augusto Assia, "Contribución positiva a la armonía europea," *La Vanguardia Española*, September 29, 1953.

The 150-year figure cited by Fernández Armesto was a reference to Pinckney's Treaty of 1795.¹⁵¹ This treaty was the first between the Spain and the nascent United States. It stipulated the establishment of friendly relations between the two nations in exchange for Spain conceding naval passage along the Mississippi River to U.S. ships. This relatively innocuous treaty in the eyes of a Spanish nationalist, however, manifested Spain's first diplomatic and territorial loss to the United States' frontier mentality and expansion, which would eventually cost Spain its last colonies (Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines) in the 1898 Spanish–American War. Citing this date as the first rupture in Spanish–American relations, therefore, subtly conveyed that the United States, through the Pact of Madrid, was finally ending its supposedly antagonistic stance towards Spain. Further, it suggested that Spain had finally, under Franco's leadership, ended a century and a half long trend of territorial decline and diminishing power.¹⁵² Beyond demonstrating that the Pact were the culmination of Spanish–American *rapprochement*, *La Vanguardia* also employed the agreements to imply enhanced Spanish power.

The Pact was always presented as a joint project, equally sought by both the Franco regime and the Eisenhower administration. The first article in *La Vanguardia*'s September 27 newspaper described the signing ceremony, detailing the respective roles of US Ambassador James C. Dunn and Spanish Foreign Minister Alberto Martín Artajo.¹⁵³ From the very start of coverage, Spain and the United States were shown working together as partners. Another article from the same day described the Pact as the “first alliance between the United States and Spain.”¹⁵⁴ The term alliance implies equality: two states agreeing to support one another.¹⁵⁵

Variations on the word “joint” (*conjunto/a*, *conjuntamente*, etc.) preceded almost every mention of the American military bases provided for under the Pact. This referred to the defense agreement, which stated that the four bases would be

¹⁵¹ In Spanish scholarship the treaty is referred to as the “Tratado de San Lorenzo.” Office of the Historian, *Milestones: Treaty of San Lorenzo/Pinckney's Treaty, 1795*, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/pickney-treaty>.

¹⁵² Ironically, the Pact of Madrid required the unprecedented surrender of territorial sovereignty to the United States.

¹⁵³ “La firma del histórico documento: En el palacio de Santa Cruz,” *La Vanguardia Española*, September 27, 1953.

¹⁵⁴ “...la primera alianza entre los Estados Unidos y España”. Assia, “El acontecimiento.”

¹⁵⁵ As discussed in Chapter One, the term “alliance” is a misnomer. The structure of executive agreements placed most obligations squarely on the Spanish state, with no binding promise of defense in case of attack.

staffed by both Americans and Spaniards, and would remain under Spanish territorial sovereignty.¹⁵⁶ Taken together, the characterization of the Pact in *La Vanguardia* clearly promoted an image of Spain as an equal partner with the United States. In reality, Spain was not a major player on the international stage during the Cold War. The country's importance came only through its connection to the United States. The United States, by comparison, was simultaneously pursuing similar agreements with other nations on the periphery of the Western Bloc.

The economic framework dominant in *La Vanguardia* is evident in this characterization. In 1953, the United States was an economic powerhouse. Its industry benefited from more modern, advanced technology, which, in turn, helped increase agricultural and industrial output. Emphasizing emerging Spanish–American ties reinforced the promise that economic aid and trade with the United States would improve the Spanish economy. *La Vanguardia* made repeated mention of the economic aid promised in the Pact. Unlike the other newspapers examined, the economic aid agreement was situated on the front page of *La Vanguardia*. Placement there proves that, from *La Vanguardia*'s perspective, the economic aspect was key. The newspaper also relayed the exact amounts of aid promised: \$141 million in military aid and \$85 million in economic aid.¹⁵⁷

The same issue contained an article explaining that the thawing of relations between Spain and the US since the country's exclusion from the Marshall Plan. The article asserted that President Truman and his advisors, as well as the French and British governments, had refused to include Spain under the auspices of the plan. US congressmen sympathetic to Franco weakened Truman's anti-Franco position and thus set the stage for the Pact of Madrid.¹⁵⁸ In

¹⁵⁶ As discussed previously, the secret additional note to Article III of the defense agreement largely negated Spanish sovereignty over both the bases themselves and American personnel. This note was not, however, public knowledge until 1977.

¹⁵⁷ "La ayuda económica a España ajustada a los términos de la ley de Seguridad Mutua, asciende como primera anualidad a doscientos veintiséis millones de dólares para el año fiscal en curso, que termina el 30 de junio de 1954 incluidos los ciento veinticinco millones asignados a España en 1951 y 1952. De dicha suma, ciento cuarenta y un millón serán empleados en gastos militares y los ochenta y cinco restantes serán destinados a fortalecer la base económica del programa de cooperación militar." "La firma."

¹⁵⁸ "La ayuda económica de los Estados Unidos a España no se realiza a la terminación de la segunda Guerra mundial, a pesar de tener los estados unidos pleno conocimiento de la situación económica española, como consecuencia de la Guerra civil y mas tarde de la citada Guerra mundial, debido a que la administración norteamericana tuvo en cuenta la oposición manifestada por los Gobiernos francés y británico...Pero, partir de 1950, se inicia una rectificación de posiciones respecto a España...Desde que se estableció el Plan Marshall, en 1947, hasta 1953,

this way, *La Vanguardia* couched the lead-up to the Pact in principally an economic context: Spain had been excluded from aid but was now a willing recipient.

Interestingly, here *La Vanguardia* was critical of the United States. *Arriba* went out of its way to avoid directing any criticism towards Spain's newfound ally. The Francoist state owed its newfound international stature to the United States and took pains not to jeopardize the relationship. *La Vanguardia*, by contrast, did not share these reservations. The newspaper was well aware that exclusion from the Marshall Plan, and other economic initiatives, had hurt Spain's growth and did not shy from placing some of the blame on the United States.

La Vanguardia's economic framing in its coverage of the Pact remained dominant throughout. On September 29th, the newspaper led with an opinion piece which argued that, in light of the unique opportunity afforded by economic aid from the Pact, the country needed economic unity in order to “intensify agricultural production and promote industrialization.”¹⁵⁹ A photograph from September 29th titled “North American Industry and Spain” shows a Spanish engineer boarding a Pan-American World Airways flight bound for New York in order to study the newest advances in domestic lighting to produce better products in Spain. Here, again, a relationship between the U.S. and Spain is shown in terms of its potential for economic benefit.

Spain's depressed economic situation at the time of the Pact of Madrid made the promised economic aid especially attractive. The Spanish Civil War devastated the economy. Much of the country's infrastructure was repurposed or destroyed during the war: roughly 250,000 buildings were razed and another 200,000 damaged to the point that they were beyond uninhabitable. Forty percent of its passenger wagons and over sixty percent of its cargo wagons were similarly ruined. A full third of the Spanish merchant marine capacity was sunk.¹⁶⁰ The country's gross domestic product (GDP) fell 36% between 1935 and 1938.¹⁶¹

pueden distinguirse en las relaciones económica hispano-norteamericanas tres periodos perfectamente determinados: Primero, una oposición total a la concesión de cualquier ayuda económica a España. Esta política, dirigida principalmente por el presidente Truman y sus secretarios de Estado — en especial Dean Acheson — tuvo como consecuencia que, mientras numerosos países del mundo recibieran una amplísima aportación económica, a España se le denegaba toda ayuda.” “Convenios bilaterales y precursores,” *La Vanguardia Española*, September 27, 1953.

¹⁵⁹ “...intensificación de la producción agrícola y fomento de la industrialización” “Necesidad nacional de una síntesis económica,” *La Vanguardia Española*, October 14, 1953.

¹⁶⁰ Harrison, *The Spanish*, 117.

¹⁶¹ Chislett, “Spain and the United States,” 15.

Accordingly, “[f]or Spain as a whole, the 1940s were a decade of prolonged hardship.”¹⁶² State policy placed a high emphasis on industrial output.¹⁶³ As a result, industry, particularly electrical production, began to surpass pre-Civil War levels by mid-decade. Agricultural production, meanwhile, foundered. Wheat production in 1948, for example, was only 64% of the 1929 level.¹⁶⁴ This led to perennial food shortages; in 1950, the per capita consumption of basic necessities, such as wheat and meat, was only 50% of the pre-war level.¹⁶⁵ Diminished economic output domestically was, unfortunately, coupled with overproduction of certain minerals abroad: “As a result of the world glut in many areas of production it proved difficult from 1945–1948, and even later, for Spain to obtain a commercially viable price for her minerals, or to arrange exchange transactions of, for example, the British coal essential to her mining industry.”¹⁶⁶

One of Franco’s few, remaining allies during the post-war period was Argentinean leader General Juan Domingo Perón. To avoid widespread starvation beginning in early 1946, Perón exported massive amounts of foodstuffs vital to Spain at below market prices. Argentinean imports accounted for at least a quarter of all goods brought into the country at the high point in 1948.¹⁶⁷ This aid effectively ended in 1949 due to Perón’s own domestic economic issues as well as to Spain being on the verge of defaulting on its debts.

The Franco regime’s haphazard pursuit of autarky, strictly protectionist economic policy, further aggravated Spain’s economic difficulties:

There is no doubt that the program of autarky was generally inefficient. Policy was relatively arbitrary and frequently improvised, and it varied considerably from one sector to another with little attempt at coordination. It intended to discourage the international market and exports in general while emphasizing import substitution industries. State controls determined nominal prices and wages in most categories, and state policy reinforced the existing structure of small enterprises by providing credit no matter how inefficient the firm. Thus the economies of scale required to optimize functioning usually could not be achieved.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶² Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 389.

¹⁶³ Here “state policy” refers only to the policies pursued by the Spanish government. As previously discussed, it is distinct from the official rhetoric and discourse of the regime.

¹⁶⁴ Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 386–390.

¹⁶⁵ Chislett, “Spain and the United States,” 15.

¹⁶⁶ Edwards, *Anglo-American Relations*, 106.

¹⁶⁷ Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 361.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 384.

Clearly, the government's economic policies were hampering growth. Economist Sima Lieberman explained the impact of autarky stating, "It had become clear to everyone in Spain that the government's pursuit of extreme autarky had kept the country poor and economically backward and that any improvement in existing economic conditions required foreign aid."¹⁶⁹

In this context, an economic aid package was welcome news to *La Vanguardia's* business-oriented readership. Finally the Spanish economy would get long overdue stimulation. Clearly, the economic incentives were of paramount importance to *La Vanguardia* and, by extension, businessmen in Spain. Compared to the other newspapers, its framing of the Pact of Madrid was uniquely economic in focus. This represented a major coup for the Franco government. Businessmen, who already supported the regime, but whose faith was flagging during the prolonged depression, had further incentive to place their faith in Francoist state.

Ironically, the economic aid, which brought businessmen back into the fold of the regime, was the part of the Pact that most embarrassed the Franco government. The state, though *Arriba*, attempted to downplay the economic aid component. The government feared that accepting aid would make Spain look weak and would highlight its own counterproductive economic policies. Meanwhile, businessmen were all too aware of the lack of growth in the country, and were reassured when the regime secured much needed economic aid.

"...Y DE ELOGIO A LA DIGNIDAD DE FRANCO"

The Pact, as previously discussed, was a major milestone for the Franco regime. It also provided General Franco with an air of legitimacy. *La Vanguardia's* coverage of the Pact frequently praised Franco for personally achieving the "historic" agreements, and credited him as their architect. The laudatory rhetoric (similar to that in *Arriba*) used in praising Franco is partially a result of the regime's attempts at strict censorship apparatus. However, from *La Vanguardia's* framing, it is evident that the newspaper, and its audience, did truly view the Pact as a positive development. Thus, the celebration of Franco should not be seen as merely a repetition of expected rhetoric. It was, rather, evidence of support for the regime from Spaniards more concerned with business than

¹⁶⁹ Lieberman, *Growth and Crisis*, 39.

political ideology. Their support was incentivized by the economic benefits promised in the Pact of Madrid.

On the first page of its September 27, 1953 newspaper, *La Vanguardia* included a “frame of honor” listing the names of the most important Spanish actors in the Pact of Madrid, among them Foreign Minister Alberto Martín Artajo and the Spanish Ambassador in Washington, José Félix de Lequerica.¹⁷⁰ Here the Caudillo was referred to as the “supreme architect”, proclaiming Franco’s central role in the successful negotiation of the Pact.¹⁷¹ From the very beginning of coverage, *La Vanguardia* placed a high premium on Franco’s own involvement.

La Vanguardia included another piece that same day detailing public speeches in support of an accord between the United States and Spain in the years leading up to the Pact. Quotes were relayed from important United States leaders all in support of *rapprochement*: former President Truman, current President Eisenhower, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Secretary of Defense General George Marshall, former Ambassador Stanton Griffis, and Senators Homer Ferguson (MI, R) and Patrick McCarran (NV, D).¹⁷² The article, importantly, led with a string of quotes from Franco himself, all asserting that agreements between the two nations were necessary and would be mutually beneficial. Through these quotes, *La Vanguardia* reinforced the image of Franco as central to the agreements by claiming that he had been their longtime advocate.

La Vanguardia again opened with strong praise of Franco on September 29, 1953. The day’s headline read, “Following the Signing of the Spanish–American Agreements: Profound Sensation of Relief in the Occidental World and Praise of the Dignity of Franco.”¹⁷³ This, very blatantly, attributed the value of

¹⁷⁰ “Cuadro de Honor” – “Cuadro de Honor,” *La Vanguardia Española*, Barcelona. September 27, 1953.

¹⁷¹ “[el] artífice supremo...” – Ibid.

¹⁷² “Mientras se desarrollaban las negociaciones para un Pacto entre España y los Estados Unidos, personalidades de los dos países hicieron manifestaciones públicas en las que se recogían impresiones sobre el alcance político de los Acuerdos o reflejaban sus opiniones personales sobre los mismos....Al recogerlas a continuación, se encuadra la firma de los Tratados hispano–norteamericanos dentro del panorama informativo general con el relieve que merece.” “Antecedentes españoles y norteamericanos del Acuerdo,” *La Vanguardia Española*, September 27, 1953.

¹⁷³ “Después de la firma de los convenios hispano–norteamericanos: Profunda sensación de alivio en el mundo occidental y de elogio a la dignidad de Franco” *La Vanguardia Española*, September 29, 1953.

the Pact to the Caudillo himself. When the Pact was later referred to as historic, *La Vanguardia* was sure to repeat that it was achieved thanks to Franco.¹⁷⁴

The cover of *La Vanguardia* the day following the signing of the Pact of Madrid best illustrated its support of Franco. Under the banner headline, “A Historic Day for the West” are four photos: one of Franco, one of Eisenhower, and two of the signing of the Pact itself in the Palacio de Santa Cruz.

Franco is, as usual, shown in full military dress. President Eisenhower, too, is shown in his military garb, even though he had resigned his military commission on May 30, 1952 in order to run for President. Thus, Eisenhower was inaccurately referred to and shown as a General, as opposed to President.¹⁷⁵ This outdated presentation of Eisenhower, as a military general instead of civilian leader, appears deliberately designed to draw a strong comparison between the two men. Here, both Franco and Eisenhower were portrayed as strong, military figures, leading their respective nations in the defense of the West. In equating Franco with Eisenhower the cover implied that Franco was both immensely powerful and respectable.

Interestingly, a subtle difference in the official titles of the two leaders actually gave the impression that Franco was more powerful than Eisenhower. Eisenhower’s military rank, which was given instead of his actual presidential title, was “General.” Thus, his title (following Spanish custom) was written as “S.E. el General Eisenhower” or “His excellency General Eisenhower”. Franco’s official military title, however, included the superlative suffix *-ísimo* that, in Spanish, is used to denote supremacy. Therefore, Franco’s title read “S.E. el Generalísimo Franco.”¹⁷⁶ This difference in naming indirectly implied that Franco outranked President Eisenhower.

The blatant praise of Franco by *La Vanguardia* documented how businessmen in Spain were further co-opted by the Franco regime through the Pact of Madrid. Political shunning and economic hardship, in part a result of the regime’s policies, risked alienating or disenfranchising the business elite. Yet, as my analysis of *La Vanguardia* proves, the Pact of Madrid were a crystalizing moment wherein Spaniards who were more concerned with profit than ideology were again assured of the value of the Franco regime.

¹⁷⁴ “...con la sencillez y naturalidad que presiden todos los actos trascendentales e históricos promovidos y resueltos por el Generalísimo Franco.” “Hombre con Hombre,” *La Vanguardia Española*, September 29, 1953.

¹⁷⁵ “S.E. el General Eisenhower” Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

CONCLUSION

Arriba, *ABC* and *La Vanguardia* all agreed that the Pact of Madrid was a step forward for Spain, but for very different reasons. *Arriba* focused on their strategic value and how it proved Spanish ideological supremacy. This further reveals that the Francoist state approached the Pact from a specifically militaristic perspective. Meanwhile, *ABC* approached the Pact with some reservations not expressed by the other groups. Yet, the Alfonsists too were optimistic about the potential of the Pact. *La Vanguardia* was enamored with the economic aid stipulation, ironically appreciating the Pact for the part most embarrassing to the regime. A material incentive, not ideology, was the driving factor in its judgment.

The Francoist state and capitalist-minded businessmen converged in their recognition of the role and legitimacy of General Francisco Franco Bahamonde. *Arriba* obviously supported the leader of the FET y de las JONS, using the Pact as evidence of his power. The business readers of *La Vanguardia*, meanwhile, interpreted the Pact as proof of Franco's efficacy. *La Vanguardia's* coverage reveals that the economic aid bought Franco renewed legitimacy.

ABC, however, subtly rejected Franco's position. The Alfonsist mouthpiece took great pains to avoid praising Franco, fearful that the importance of the pact would lend him prestige and weaken the relative position of their ideal leader, the Alfonsist claimant, Don Juan de Borbón.

Ultimately, the various and distinct perspectives of the Pact of Madrid expressed in *Arriba*, *ABC* and *La Vanguardia Española* reveal a diverse political landscape in "Franco's Spain."

APPENDIX – MISCELLANEOUS NEWSPAPER DATA



