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Cover Page Footnote

This article is an extract from my current dissertation thesis, *The Second Spanish Republic and Civil War: The View from Pope Pius XI's Vatican*. I would like to thank my advisor Gustavo Nanclares for his support and Alessandro Visani for his archival knowledge. Portions of this paper were presented at the 2010 ASPHS Annual Meeting in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

For the Republic or the Church: The Vatican's Reactions to the Development of Spain's Second Republic in 1931*

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The declaration of the Second Spanish Republic initiated a series of rapid and substantial changes to the state in 1931. The local elections of 12 April 1931 were not intended to dismantle the monarchy and change the government, but supporters of a Republic viewed the strong showings in urban areas by their allies as a signal to act.¹ In the following days, King Alfonso XIII left Spain, while the leaders of the Republican movement celebrated their victory, established a Provisional Government, and began to schedule nation-wide elections for a Constitutional Convention.² From the declaration of the Second Republic until the election victory of the conservative CEDA coalition in 1933, liberal democrats and socialists had a majority in the Spanish Government. Spanish legal codes and Constitutional provisions began to remove the influence of conservative and traditional elements in Spanish society. A central target of the Republic's attention was the Spanish Catholic Church. The Constitution of 1931 and following legal acts of the Republic attempted to remove Catholic influence in Spanish society by nationalizing all Church property, banning Catholic education in public schools, and secularizing the laws of the state. Members of the Spanish clergy began to speak out against what they saw as unfair practices of the state

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¹ Stanley G. Payne, *Spain's First Democracy: The Second Republic, 1931-1936* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 31-35.

² *ibid.*

against the Church, something frequently studied in the field of 1930s Spanish history.³ This work focuses on the reactions of the Vatican and its hierarchy in Spain regarding the declaration of the Second Republic, something that could not be fully studied until the Vatican began to open the files of Pope Pius XI in the *Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari* in 2003. I will focus on two issues concerning the Holy See's influence in Spain: the declaration of the Republic and the formulation of the Republican Constitution. I use communications amongst Papal Nuncio Federico Tedeschini, Vatican Secretary of State Pacelli (later, Pope Pius XII), and representatives of the Republican government to explore the developing and ever-expanding tensions between the Holy See and the Second Republic concerning Catholic influence in the state. The official Vatican response towards the Republic was cautiously optimistic, yet developments in Spain pushed Pope Pius XI to release his encyclical, *Dilectissima Nobis* in 1933.

A study of the relationship between the Holy See and the Spanish Republic is necessary for various reasons. First, as Hilari Raguer has established in his research, the role of Catholicism in 1930s Spanish conflicts has been treated as a “chorus” and not a primary character during the period, indicating that more studies concerning the actions and opinions of the Catholic Church should be completed.⁴ A closer investigation into the concerns of the Holy See about the Spanish Republic is still required. Second, this work will compliment previous studies of the Spanish Republic that have outlined the internal religious tension in Spain during the 1930s. Third, this work will attempt to clarify the position of the Holy See within the international arena during the 1930s. While the common belief may have been that the Holy See maintained a great deal of direct political influence within Spain during the 1930s, this research will help to establish the conclusion that the Holy See had turned over much of its diplomatic control in Spain to its representatives in the state. The Lateran Accords of 1929 had established an independent, yet neutral Vatican state that was not supposed to intervene in foreign conflicts unless invited by all sides. The Holy See, therefore, was handcuffed by this agreement with Fascist Italy and appeared to avoid participation during certain political dilemmas. The Holy See was forced to rely upon its representatives in Spain, but when it finally responded publicly, the reaction from the populace varied greatly, highlighting the Vatican's precarious

³ See: Gonzalo Redondo, *Historia de la Iglesia en España 1931-1939* (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, S.A., 1993), Frances Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), Alfonso Álvarez Bolado, *Para Ganar la Guerra, Para Ganar la Paz: Iglesia y Guerra Civil, 1936-1939*. (Madrid: UPCo, 1995), and William J. Callahan, *The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875-1998* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000).

⁴ Hilari Raguer, *Gunpowder and Incense: The Catholic Church and the Spanish Civil War* (London: Routledge, 2007), 1.

position during this period of political and ideological instability.⁵ This project works to highlight the confusing environment of 1931 Spain to show that compromise between the two governments became quite difficult to find.

When the Second Republic was declared on 14 April, the Vatican quickly learned of the changing political environment in Spain from its Papal Nuncio in Madrid, Federico Tedeschini,⁶ other religious leaders, and through the Republic's communications with Church representatives. According to José M. Sánchez, Tedeschini was not a supporter of Spain's intransigent Traditionalists or moderate Alfonsists, but he was most connected with the liberal Catholic reformers. Tedeschini was a "firm believer in moderate social reform, and he was also aware of the gravity of religious problems in socially underdeveloped countries."⁷ The Nuncio's belief in moderate social reform allowed him to see the possible benefits to republicanism in Spain, but his beliefs put him at odds with conservative religious leaders like Cardinal Primate of Toledo Pedro Segura y Sáenz. As the Republic began to establish its legal frameworks, Tedeschini's personal beliefs in reform most likely changed because he believed the government radicalized. From its inception, the Republic represented a new and challenging entity for the Holy See because it appeared unclear how the Second Republic would be structured and how it would react to the Catholic Church. One of the first communications between the Provisional Republican Government and the Vatican hierarchy in Spain occurred in 17 April 1931. The newly appointed

⁵ The sources explored in this essay do not contain the personal opinions or thoughts of the primary actors in the Vatican or the Second Republic. Only those official documents archived can be evaluated. At the same time, this essay does not aim to place blame on either side for the deteriorating relationship between the Holy See and the Second Republic.

⁶ In 1900, Federico Tedeschini began working for the Vatican Secretary of State's Office following the completion of his Doctorates in Philosophy, Theology, and Canonical Rights. In 1914, Pope Benedict XV named him as a substitute for the Secretary of State. On 31 March 1921, Pope Benedict XV made Tedeschini the Apostolic Nuncio to the King of Spain. In 1936, Pope Pius XI made Tedeschini a Cardinal, and he returned to Rome. Tedeschini's ascension in the Office of the Vatican Secretary of State coincided with Pope Benedict XV's attempts to reestablish the Vatican as a moral leader in world political affairs, particularly during the First World War. During WWI, Pope Benedict tried to negotiate for peace, but his plans failed. On one hand, both the Allies and the Central Powers did not appreciate this revived Vatican interest in international political concerns, but on the other, the Vatican left the WWI-era as both a religious institution, and as Stewart A. Stehlin states "an international one dealing with problems of nations and individuals alike." Tedeschini, therefore, must have been influenced by this new role for the Holy See—the Vatican became more active in international conflicts, and its mediation was frequently not appreciated by certain belligerents. See: Vicente Cárcel Ortí, *Pío XI entre la República y Franco* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 2008), 382-3 and Stewart A. Stehlin "The Emergence of a New Vatican Diplomacy during the Great War and Its Aftermath, 1914-1929" in *Papal Diplomacy in the Modern Age*, eds. Peter C. Kent and John F. Pollard (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 76-7.

⁷ José M. Sánchez, *The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 50.

Minister of the State, Alejandro Lerroux, of the centrist Republican Radical Party, sent an official letter to Federico Tedeschini to describe the changes that had been occurring in Spain over the previous days. Lerroux, who had abandoned his formerly populist views and became a political moderate and observant Catholic, explained to the Holy See the spontaneous departure of the monarch.⁸ According to Lerroux and the Provisional government, Alfonso XIII had voluntarily left Spain and the new Republic had obtained control over the national sovereignty. Lerroux's letter suggested Vatican recognition of the authority of the Republic would help the Republic to stabilize and garner international support.⁹ The first communication between Lerroux and the Nuncio was not one of confrontation, but was a respectful request for Vatican assistance. Lerroux, who represented the Spanish political middle and worked for compromise amongst the various political parties in the government, had extended a hand to the Church in the hope that cooperation between the two would stabilize the Republic. Lerroux, of course, was not the only member of the Spanish Provisional Government, and the Spanish Catholic hierarchy began to grow concerned about more radical Leftist representatives gaining positions and influence in the new government.¹⁰ The

⁸ Alejandro Lerroux was not always a political moderate. In his youth, he was a member of the Radical Republican party and gave anticlerical speeches at the turn of the century, making him popular with workers' unions. In 1908, he founded the Radical Party, but the movement lost its left-wing support in 1929, moving his supporters to the political middle. For many, Lerroux was a political opportunist. As Nigel Townson explains, Lerroux and the Radical Party remained often ambiguous on certain political issues—such as Church influence. By the 1930s, Lerroux was not calling for complete social revolution, and considered working with monarchists in the hopes of establishing some political transition. This willingness to cooperate with certain monarchists created tensions with other Republican parties and within his own. Lerroux called for consensus over conflict in the political arena. As Minister of State, however, many accused Lerroux of being a mildly corrupt opportunist who promoted his allies. Why would the Vatican place hope in this man? Unlike many other more radical Republicans, Lerroux at least spoke of Catholic rights in Spain. His calls for political consensus sounded like those of Alcalá Zamora and other Catholic Ministers, possibly offering some comfort to the Holy See. See: Nigel Townson, *The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics under the Second Republic, 1931-1936* (Portland, Oreg: Sussex Academic Press, 2000). Archivio Segreto Vaticano: Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari, Spagna (ASV: AES, Spagna): Fasc. 116 Pos 784, 82r. In this Vatican file, Tedeschini states that Lerroux and Alcalá Zamora were trustworthy.

⁹ “Puede ofrecer al mundo entero como demostración de su alta capacidad, los procedimientos más de acuerdo con el progreso moral y jurídico de los pueblos civilizados,” ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 116 Pos 784, 82v.

¹⁰ The Republican government was comprised of numerous parties: Socialists, Radicals, Esquerra Republicana, Liberal Republican Right, Federalists, Galicianists, Republican Action, Radical Socialists, Independent Republicans, “Al Servicio de la República”, and Liberal Democrats. Payne, *op.cit.*, 51. With all these parties having influence in the coalition, it cannot be surprising that the Holy See did not know who would rise to what roles. As Gonzalo Redondo explains, the Provisional Government's leadership was a mixed bag: President Niceto Alcalá Zamora (conservative republican), Secretary of State Alejandro Lerroux (Centrist Radical), Minister of Justice Fernando de los Ríos (Socialist), Minister of Army Manuel Azaña (Acción Republicana), Minister of the Navy Santiago Casares Quiroga (Galician Autonomist), Minister of

Catholic Church did have political influence in Spain, and it hoped less-radical elements—like President Niceto Alcalá Zamora or even the often politically motivated Lerrox—could direct the Republic and renew the relationship between the two states.

The Second Republic hoped to obtain “*reconocimiento*” [recognition] from the Holy See for the new government. Papal Nuncio Tedeschini wrote to Vatican Secretary of State Pacelli on 26 April 1931 to discuss the issue of recognition and report on the developments that occurred over the first weeks of the Republic. Tedeschini wrote that the Minister of State Lerrox had requested the Vatican openly recognize the Second Republic, and in doing so, the Catholic Church would be able to support the Republic’s attempts to maintain peace and order within the state.¹¹ The Second Republic saw the benefits of Vatican support to maintain order in the new regime. Vatican recognition would help the government prove its legitimacy to observant Spanish Catholics. Tedeschini, however, was not ready to suggest the Holy See fully recognize the Republican Government until Madrid made specific promises to the Catholic Church. The Nuncio continued his letter by acknowledging the problems he saw in Spain. He expressed concerns over a lack of proposed legislation to protect the freedom of religion—namely Catholicism—in Spain and the government’s attempts to exclude clergy from the public life.¹² The Republic courted the Vatican for support and recognition, but the new government had not offered the Catholic Church the guarantees it wanted, which made it difficult for the Holy See to give its complete support for the Republic. After a short period, however, the Holy See and the Spanish Catholic Church appeared to agree that the recognition of the Second Spanish Republic was a logical course of action.

Even though the Republic did gain Vatican recognition on 9 May 1931, the increased influence of radical leftists within the Republican leadership made Tedeschini nervous. Vatican recognition of the Second Spanish Republic was announced in two manners. First, the Committee of Metropolitans in Spain sent a collective statement acknowledging the change of the Spanish regime on this date. Second, as William Callahan explains, the Nuncio Federico Tedeschini, on behalf of the Pope, urged Spanish Catholics to support the new government. Before formal recognition, the 18 April 1931 letter from Nuncio Tedeschini to Secretary of State Pacelli contained a report about the composition of the Republican

Housing Indalecio Prieto (Socialist), Minister of the Government Miguel Maura (conservative republican), Minister of Public Education Marcelino Domingo (Radical Socialist), Minister of Promotion Álvaro de Albornoz (Radical Socialist), Minister of Work Francisco Largo Caballero (Socialist), Economics Minister Lluís Nicolau d’Owler (Catalan Autonomist), and Minister of Communications Diego Martínez Barrio (Centrist Radical), Redondo, *op.cit.*, 131.

¹¹ ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 116 Pos. 784, 84r.

¹² ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 116 Pos 784, 84v.

government and Tedeschini's concerns regarding its Leftist inclusion.¹³ Tedeschini wrote that, "The composition of the new Government is a mixture of Republicans and Socialists."¹⁴ This statement was grounded in fact because the members of Republican and Socialist political parties—including Catholic Republican Parties—had previously agreed upon the "Pact of San Sebastian" in 17 August 1930, promising to unite to obtain political goals in Spain.¹⁵ The Republic's provisional government brought together a variety of individuals ranging from moderates to radical socialists—making a complete understanding of the Republican ideology uncertain.¹⁶ The Papal Nuncio thought it was possible to work with President Niceto Alcalá Zamora, who had been a Minister for the Crown before becoming a Republican, but most importantly, he was a political moderate and a Catholic.¹⁷ Alcalá Zamora and Lerrox were Catholics, but the Nuncio had expressed concerns about many others. Tedeschini concluded the government was not completely "anticlerical" but he alluded to strong atheist and Masonic influences, even though he did not list specific names.¹⁸ It is clear the Vatican understood atheist and Masonic values as direct affronts to its authority, but much like members of the Provisional Government, the hierarchy could not

¹³ Callahan, *op.cit.*, 278.

¹⁴ "La composizione del nuovo Governo raccoglie repubblicani e socialisti." ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 116 Pos. 784, 71r.

¹⁵ Payne, *op.cit.*, 27. The central focus of this pact was to unite all supporters of a Republic and undermine King Alfonso XIII's authority. Members of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and Niceto Alcalá-Zamora also attended to support the movement.

¹⁶ The mixture of socialists and other liberal parties gave supporters of the Republic larger numbers, but it did not also result in a smooth transition. As Manuel Álvarez Tardío explains, the wide spectrum of Republican supporters meant that unanimous agreements on the actions of the Republic could rarely be met. As an example, the elections for the Constitutional Convention in June resulted in fragmented leftist control. Radical Socialists, Socialists, Republican Action, Independent Republicans, Esquerra Republicana of Cataluña, and others acted as the majority coalition. Conservative Republicans and the Radical Centrist Party of Lerrox did not always agree with the majority coalition. Each of these parties had specific goals for Spain, so it can be easily understood why the Vatican representatives were so weary about the future of Spain. Who would become the dominant power in the state still remained unclear. Manuel Álvarez Tardío, *Anticlericalismo y libertad de conciencia: Política, religion en la Segunda República Española, 1931-1936*. (Madrid: Centros de Estudios Políticos y Costitucionales, 2002), 133-4.

¹⁷ ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 116 Pos. 784, 71r.

¹⁸ ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 116 Pos. 784, 71r. Regarding Masonry, Stanley Payne summarizes the consensus about the order in Republican politics by writing, "For over a hundred years the Masonic Orders had been intensely combated in Spain by Catholic conservatives, who saw in Masonry the spearhead of liberal anticlericalism. A sizeable cross section of Republicans were indeed Masons, but historians would later point out that Masons themselves became increasingly politically divided, in some cases ending up on opposite sides in the Civil War. Spanish Masonry clearly did not represent any monolithic conspiracy, though it is also true that by the second year of the Republic the dominant sector of Madrid Masons would become strongly committed to left Republican politics, in turn provoking considerable resistance among the more moderate members of the order," Payne, *op.cit.*, 37.

determine in which direction Spain would move.¹⁹ Even with this uncertainty, Gonzalo Redondo explains, and evidence from the Secret Vatican Archives shows, that the Holy See was not “anti-republican” or hostile to the Republican cause at the government’s inception.²⁰

For Tedeschini, it appeared as if the uncertain composition of the new Republic was the main concern for the Vatican and its diplomatic attitudes on Spain. The Nuncio believed the new government could either follow a moderate republican structure, or it could be commandeered by radical socialist elements. For the Nuncio, though, either outcome signaled the new Republic would be quite different from the monarchies of the past, specifically for the fact that it would most likely choose to follow a secular structure.²¹ Moderate Republicans had distinct differences with radical socialists in how far their secularizing process would go. The Vatican had growing fears of Leftist parties, especially communists, because they had become increasingly influential with support of the Soviet Union and its Communist International. Tedeschini seemed to be uncertain as to which groups would take the lead in the government: “It is difficult not to say impossible, that these diverse forces will be able to take many paths together.”²² Less than a week after the declaration of the Republic, Papal Nuncio Tedeschini explained his apprehensions about the more radical elements of the political Left becoming active in the government, even if he was still unclear what roles they would play. Even as the threats of atheism and secularism remained possible in the Republic, the Vatican hierarchy took a wait-and-see attitude. The Holy See’s approach protected it from anticlerical hostility in Spain, but also was evidence that the Vatican still believed moderates could lead the state.

The structure of the Republican government was an important matter, but so was the territorial integrity of the state. From the moment the Republic was proclaimed, various regions declared their autonomy. Certain areas in Spain, particularly Cataluña and País Vasco, had historical and cultural difference from dominant Castilla, and the Republic’s declaration gave these regions an

¹⁹ Freemasonry had been a worry for the Catholic Church for centuries. In 1738, Pope Clement XII released his encyclical *Eminentissimi Apostolatus Specula* against freemasonry. Clement considered the views of freemasonry, especially religious tolerance, as a heresy. Following Clement’s encyclical, Spain’s King Felipe V ordered the Inquisition to try masons for crimes against the faith. Absolutist leaders and the Catholic Church disliked the secret practices and meetings of the Freemasons, seeing them as a threat. See: Charles H. Lyttle, “Historical Bases of Rome’s Conflict with Freemasonry” *Church History* 9 (1940) pp. 3-23.

²⁰ Redondo, *op.cit.*, 135.

²¹ ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 116 Pos. 784, 71r-71v.

²² “È difficile, per non dire impossibile che queste forze così diverse possano fare molto cammino insieme.” ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 116 Pos. 784, 78r.

opportunity to push for greater self-determination. Spanish monarchs had prevented regionalist aspirations to protect the state's territorial integrity. With the monarch now gone, and confusion existing in Madrid, this was the best time to make these declarations. The most vocal declaration came on 14 April as the leader of the Catalan Estat Català and Esquerra confederation, Francesc Macià, declared a "Catalan State" that would work towards the creation of a new "Confederation of Iberian Peoples."²³ This news was significant for the composition of the Republic as well as for the diplomatic channels of the Holy See. Tedeschini reported to the Vatican his anxieties about this new "Catalan Republic", which men like Macià and Barcelona mayor Lluís Companys led. Tedeschini feared this government would be left-wing and more secular than the Church would prefer.²⁴ Tedeschini also reported the possible spread of regionalism in País Vasco, Valencia, and Galicia.²⁵ Regionalism, like the formation of the new Republic, proved to be a concern for the future of the relationship of the Church with its followers because each region's political consolidation could affect the level of Catholic influence. Regions with higher levels of anticlerical attitudes, like Cataluña, could further reduce Catholicism's influence in the state. The Vatican's fear of regionalism can support the belief that the Church did miss the centralized authority of a monarch, or more recently, the power of Dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera—even though he used Catholicism as more of a tool to unify the state rather than creating a true Catholic revival.

Communications between the Spanish Minister of State Lerroux and Papal Nuncio Tedeschini remained cordial and positive, as long as each side had something to offer the other. Communiqués from Vatican Secretary of State Pacelli to Lerroux show the Vatican was willing to assist the new Republic, but for its own guarantees. The 24 April 1931 letter from Tedeschini stated:

[Vatican Secretary of State Pacelli] Has ordered me to communicate with Your Excellency that the Holy See is prepared to back the Provisional Government in the work of conserving order, in the confidence that the Government will also respect on its part the rights of the Church and of the Catholics in a Nation in which the totality of the people professes to the Catholic Religion.²⁶

²³ Payne, *op.cit.*, 32-3.

²⁴ ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 116 Pos. 784, 78r.

²⁵ ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 116 Pos. 784, 78v.

²⁶ "Me ha ordenado comunicar a V.E. que la Santa Sede está dispuesta a secundar al Gobierno provisional en la obra de la conservación del orden, en la confianza de que también el Gobierno respetará de su parte los derechos de la Iglesia y de los católicos en una Nación en que la totalidad del pueblo profesa la Religión Católica." ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 116 Pos. 784, 86r.

The following day, 25 April, Lerrox affirmatively responded to Tedeschini's letter, suggesting the Republic was happy to continue working with the Holy See. Lerrox explained the Republican Government deeply wanted to maintain the historical relationship between "*ambas Potencias*" [both Powers] in the hopes the connection would lay the groundwork for continued Vatican support.²⁷ If the Catholic Church maintained its role in society and if the Republic secured order, then it appeared that both sides could cooperate. The optimistic repartee between the two was relatively short-lived as the Republican Constitutional Convention began to diminish the role of Catholicism within the state. The Papal Nuncio and the Spanish Catholic Church initiated their own series of "complaints" against anticlerical legislation in the Republic. These complaints also contained other, and sometimes more pressing, concerns for the Holy See.

While the communications between the Provisional Government of the Second Republic and the Holy See progressed in the normal course of political formality, the Holy See became increasingly concerned with the growing anticlerical street-violence directed towards priests, monks, churches, and monasteries. This violence initiated a series of telegrams between the Holy See and its Nuncio in Spain to determine what actions should be taken. On 10 May 1931, the *Círculo Monárquico*—an organization of Monarchists opposed to the Republic—met for the first time in Madrid.²⁸ This first meeting of the *Círculo* did not end peacefully, as Republican militias attacked and burned its building, leading to several deaths. The burning of the *Círculo Monárquico* and the violence surrounding that day were the basis for an 11 May 1931 note from Tedeschini to Pacelli.²⁹ In it, Tedeschini reports of a "*Situazione Grave*" [Grave Situation] in Madrid due to the sacking of the *Círculo Monárquico*, the attack on the Monarchist *ABC* newspaper, and a reported "*Chiesa Gesuiti incendiata*" [burned Jesuit Church].³⁰ For the Vatican hierarchy, the increase in violence

²⁷ ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 116 Pos. 784, 87r.

²⁸ Payne, *op.cit.*, 44.

²⁹ Activities at the *Círculo Monárquico* were suspended by the police on the night of 10 May due to the threat of riots. Some monarchist supporters, like the Miralles brothers, were arrested and held in prison for two years until they were acquitted. Following the closure of the building, rumors spread that monarchists had killed a Republican taxi driver. Following this rumor, church burnings spread to other Spanish cities: 41 in Malaga, 21 Valencia, 13 in Alicante, and 11 in Madrid. In these attacks, however, there were no reported deaths of clergy. Most attacks occurred in cities with strong anarchist unions. As a result of the violence, the Republican government created a new urban police force and arrested hundreds of monarchist agitators. See Payne, *op.cit.*, 46.

³⁰ ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 133 Pos. 787-788, 29r.

against the Church and its supporters showed the Republic seemed either unable or unwilling to protect the safety of the clergy and their property.³¹

Anarchists and Communists increased their attacks against symbols of the *Ancien Régime* in Spain, particularly Church property. On 15 May 1931, only five days after the violence at the *Círculo Monárquico* and *ABC* in Madrid, Tedeschini wrote to the Holy See to inform the Vatican of the new carnage. Tedeschini wrote, “It cannot be affirmed with certainty that the Government provoked the incendiary movement, but it is easy to demonstrate that it did nothing to stop it.”³² Tedeschini and the Spanish Catholic Church began to identify problems within the promises of the Republic. “The Government’s excuse is that it was not able to defend all the numerous convents that exist in Madrid: but it would be very easy to respond that it could defend at least one of them.”³³ The violence in Madrid and other Spanish cities against the Church and its property was a serious concern for the Holy See and Tedeschini speculated certain members of the government, particularly those sympathetic to communism, took advantage of the lack of government intervention as an excuse to destroy the physical influence of Catholicism in Spain.³⁴ The Spanish Catholic Church offered a protest to the Spanish Republic to ask for greater help in protecting its property and for the payment of reparations for damages, but the Second Republic denied these claims.

The memories of the May 1931 events did not disappear from the Church’s thoughts. The following year, Tedeschini wrote Pacelli to request his support for a protest marking the one-year anniversary of the original violence. Tedeschini’s letter to the Holy See explained a formal complaint from the Papal Nuncio in Madrid could act as a peaceful yet strong reminder to the Republic of the destruction of Catholic Churches and religious organizations that had occurred in May 1931.³⁵ The Catholic Church in Spain was not about to forget the violence from a year earlier, nor was it willing to overlook the lack of reparations it requested. The Church held the state responsible for the lack of protection. The

³¹ Stanley G. Payne, “Spain: The Church, the Second Republic, and the Franco Regime” in *Catholics, the State, and the European Radical Right, 1919-1945*, eds. Richard J. Wolff and Jörg K. Hoensch (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1987). In his article, Payne argues that the Republic allowed its supporters to act violently, fearing loss of support from its allies if the state intervened.

³² “No si può certamente dire che il Governo abbia provocato il movimento incendiario; ma é facile il dimostrare che non ha fatto nulla per impedirlo.” ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 133 Pos. 787-788, 50v.

³³ “Pretesta il Governo che non poteva difendere i troppi numerosi conventi che esistono in Madrid: ma si potrebbe rispondere molto facilmente che se ne poteva difendere almeno uno.” ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 133, Pos 787-788, 51r.

³⁴ ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 133 Pos 787-788, 51v.

³⁵ ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 134 Pos. 788, 47r.

Vatican hierarchy allowed the Papal Nuncio in Spain to release his personal letter of protest to the Spanish Government speaking for the Holy See directly. Tedeschini wrote in his letter of 11 May 1932 that the Holy See reiterated its “peaceful and determined protest” to the Republican Government to obtain reparations that had been requested due to the events of the previous year in the hopes of returning justice to the “noble and Catholic Spanish Nation.”³⁶ In the following years the Holy See referenced the attacks of the Republican period during the Civil War to pressure the government for protection from violent militias. While the Church was not able to respond with physical force to these attacks, it was able to use its diplomatic channels to remind the Second Republic of these crimes and request reparations (even if never paid). The early plan for Vatican diplomacy appeared to be strongly worded yet respectful letters to remind the Republic of the Church’s potentially vulnerable position in Spain.

Two and a half months after the declaration of the Republic, the Provisional Government held parliamentary elections on 28 June 1931. Parties of the Left, particularly the Socialists, won an overwhelming majority of seats.³⁷ The Left created a Republican Coalition that promised to move Spain away from the “failed” policies of the past and create a new constitution to shift Spain into the future.³⁸ The Spanish Constitutional Convention convened in Madrid on 14 July, Bastille Day, which was a symbolic date for the political left. The creation of this constitution included a great deal of discussion regarding the role of traditional elements of Spain, particularly the Church. The Constitution was finalized and signed in December 1931. The path to the elections of 28 June and the Constitutional Convention was of particular importance for the Catholic Church because anticlerical language and actions had increased prior to the convention. The following section will show that the Constitutional debate represented the greatest concern for the Catholic Church because all future Spanish laws would be derived from this document. The Vatican feared the government would continue to attack Catholic rights in Spain.

The election of 28 June was quite important for the state because the victorious party would have control over the writing of the new Constitution. The Republic was not alone in its interests. Papal Nuncio Tedeschini realized the

³⁶ “Serena y decidida protesta... noble y católica Nación Española.” ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 134 Pos. 788, 62r.

³⁷ The Republican coalition in Cortes (in number of seats): Socialists 113, Radicals 87, Esquerra Republicana 36, Liberal Republican Right 27, Federalists 19, Galicianists 19, Republican Action 16, Radical Socialists 61, Independent Republicans 18, “Al Servicio de la República” 7, Liberal Democrats 4 (Total 407). The Opposition coalition in the Cortes (in number of seats): Basque Nationalists 6, Lliga Catalana 2, Agrarian Party 14, National Action 5, Traditionalists 4, Monarchists 1, Miscellaneous Rightists 19 (Total 51). Payne, *op.cit.*, 51.

³⁸ Payne, *op.cit.*, 50.

importance of the vote. As he wrote to the Holy See on 20 June, the Nuncio stated, “Since last night, alarms started again in convents and religious houses, and there is uncertainty and panic because of the actions by syndicalists and communists trying to prevent the election for the Cortes this 28th.”³⁹ Violence surrounding the upcoming election was a major anxiety for the Holy See because fear could prevent “good Catholics” from voting. According to the memo, some workers’ unions and communists had seized the period before the election to threaten their political enemies, but as Gabriel Jackson concludes, political disarray on the Right lost the election for conservatives.⁴⁰

Tedeschini’s concern about violence in the week before the election colored the Holy See’s views of the Provisional Government. On 1 June 1931, the Office of the Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs of the Holy See compiled a report on the “Religious Affairs in Spain” from previous reports it had received. This report will be explored over the next few pages. The Holy See drew conclusions about how the Second Republic acted towards the Spanish Catholic Church. “The provisional Government, composed in its totality of sectarians, continues its advance against the rights of the Church without stopping its path.”⁴¹ According to the report, the goal of the government was to attack and reduce the influence of the Church in Spain. The report continued with a critical review of the proposed theme of freedom of religion relating to education: “The decree of Religious Freedom in education speaks of *commitments from the Government?* With whom?? From where will these commitments arrive?”⁴² The Church believed the Republic was systematically reducing its influence in Spain and did not think it received the respect that it deserved. The report continued by acknowledging the Church worked for peace and was respectful towards any state and any form of government, as long as its rights were being protected.⁴³ The Church, though, believed the Provisional Government was not respecting its rights in Spain and they became more concerned with the future path. The

³⁹“Da ieri sera è ricominciato allarme conventi e case religiose e regna incertezza e panico per maneggi sindacalisti e comunisti che si sforzano impedire elezioni per Cortes del 28 corrente.” ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 118 Pos. 784, 11r.

⁴⁰ While the Nuncio’s letter reported on widespread violence, historian Gabriel Jackson concluded that while workers in mining and seaport regions made their opinions well-known through demonstrations, the overall disarray of the moderate and conservative parties was responsible for the Left’s victory. Gabriel Jackson, *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 41.

⁴¹ “El Gobierno provisional, compuesto en su casi totalidad de sectarios, sigue su avance contra los derechos de la Iglesia sin detenerse en su camino.” ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 119, Pos 784, 5_10.

⁴² “El decreto de la libertad religiosa en la enseñanza habla de *compromisos del Gobierno?* Con quien?? Hasta donde llegan estos compromisos?” ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 119 Pos 784, 5_10.

⁴³ ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 119 Pos. 784, 05_42, 05_46.

conflict between the Church and the state came to a head during the official process of drafting the state's Constitution, but still no Papal communications were directed to the government.⁴⁴

This report from the Office of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs of the Holy See also contained a warning for the Catholic hierarchy in Spain about Church documents. Because information coming from Spain had frequently commented on the deteriorating conditions for the clergy, the report included warnings for the production and dissemination of religious materials in the country. It stated, "The pastoral documents, in these circumstances, should be published with singular care due to the grave dangers that encircle their interpretations."⁴⁵ The Office believed that the dangerous conditions in Spain meant members of the clergy should be careful with their publications and other written materials for fears of violent repercussions. While the Vatican Archives speak in generalities, it can be assumed that this note referred to pastorals of men like Cardinal Pedro Segura y Sáenz. José M. Sánchez suggests that since the declaration of the Third French Republic in 1870, the Holy See tried to soften its opinions about republican governments in order to protect it from further violence. Sánchez believes that this fear of violent reprisals from republicans was a reason for the Holy See, and the Spanish Catholic hierarchy, to appear willing to work with the Second Spanish Republic. Cardinal Segura, the Archbishop of Toledo, however, was unwilling to placate republicanism. His 6 May pastoral letter highlighted his longing for monarchy and disdain for the Republic. This language produced an angry response from Madrid—expelling him from Spain in July. This pastoral may have been seen as a catalyst for the attacks against religious sites on 10 and 11 May. Most interestingly, Sánchez concludes that the Holy See and the Nuncio would have been happy with Segura's expulsion from

⁴⁴ Any attempt to reform the role of the Catholic Church was met with serious resistance by Catholics—both through the clergy and the laity. Conservatives had reacted to 19th century attempts to reduce Catholicism role in state, and it should have come as no surprise that more vocal protests should come during the Second Republic. As William J. Callahan writes, "If Spain's modern history proved anything, it showed that any attempt to alter the Church's privileges provoked resistance. In this respect, the Second Republic faced a more formidable institution than did its nineteenth-century predecessor. The expansion of the religious orders, the proliferation and modernization of Catholic associations, particularly in the field of social Catholicism, and the identification of ecclesiastical interests with those of an educated, wealthy bourgeoisie provided the Church with a more resilient foundation for resistance than that available to the clergy struggling against nineteenth-century liberalism" Callahan, *op.cit.*, 274. The Vatican had numerous and more vocal allies in Spain that could fight the battles for the Holy See. The Vatican hierarchy did not need to lead all the protests against the Republic, but relied on active organizational participation in Spain.

⁴⁵ "Los documentos pastorales en estas circunstancias deberán ser publicados con singular cuidado por los graves peligros que encierra su interpretación..." ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 119 Pos. 784, 05_21.

Spain in the hopes it would improve Church-State relations, particularly as the constitutional debates appeared on the horizon.⁴⁶ The Holy See had not instructed its clergy to *stop* pastoral letters, even those critical of the Republic, but it did warn its religious leaders to be careful with their documents—the Vatican wanted to avoid conflict and was willing to allow controversial Church figures to be removed.

Even with these warnings, the Office of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs did not think that good Catholics in Spain needed to abandon their participation in the Constitutional Convention. This 1 June AES report did contain some hope for the development of the Constitution in Spain. The note called for good Catholics, whether they were “*monarchiche o repubblicane*” to run for office in the Spanish Parliament.⁴⁷ The Vatican’s idea was that no matter the political persuasion of a candidate, if he were a good Catholic he would try to protect the Church. The problem for the Holy See was the overwhelming Leftist and Socialist victories in the elections prevented “good Catholics” from gaining positions in the Convention. Even though the Vatican had grave concerns about the formulation of the Republic, its suggestion to the Catholic hierarchy was to persuade parishioners to run in the elections. The Holy See requested its followers work in the political system of the Republic—like during the Third French Republic. José Sánchez explains that during the Papacy of Leo XIII (1878-1903), the Pope released his encyclicals *Quod apostolici muneris* (1878), *Immortale Dei* (1885), and *Au milieu des sollicitudes* (1892), which allowed Catholics to accept a republican form of government and participate in the political realm as long as the government protected Church rights.⁴⁸ The Church may have not liked the possible composition of the Republic, but it is important to note the Vatican still proposed that its supporters work in the confines of the rules. A 2 June 1931 letter from Madrid to the Holy See also supports the idea the Catholic Church thought it was working in the legal framework of the government and the Church was not supporting any particular political groups. The letter stated that the supporters of the Church were “a defensive force of Catholic interest” yet Catholics did not necessarily have to support one form of government over another.⁴⁹

While the Constitutional Convention was meeting, Papal Nuncio Tedeschini and others in the Spanish Catholic hierarchy sent numerous communications to the Vatican to keep them posted on the developments. While

⁴⁶ Sánchez, *op.cit.*, 53-55.

⁴⁷ ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 119 Pos. 784, 05_26.

⁴⁸ Sánchez, *op.cit.*, 53.

⁴⁹ “Una fuerza defensiva de los intereses católicos” ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 122 Pos. 784,

the representatives discussed much in the Convention, those articles particular to the role of the Catholic Church in Spain were of the most importance to the Catholic hierarchy. The first major concern for the Nuncio was Article 3, the declaration that Spain would be a state without an official religion. In a 7 July 1931 letter, Tedeschini expressed his concerns about this controversial issue:

“There does not exist a State religion. The Catholic Church will be considered as a corporation of public right. The same status will be granted to other religious organizations when they request it, provided their constitution and the number of their members offer guarantees of subsistence.” Let’s examine by parts this article written in an absolute and rough form.

“There is no State religion.” What does one want to say with that? Logically examining this proposition comes to be universal and negative and resolved in something else: the religion of the state does not exist. From this one can deduce that no state has or should have a religion, which is saying the State is atheistic: an error condemned by the Church and by reason itself. The state, like man, depends on God in its existence and in its government and should recognize this dependency and render it the due veneration by professing the only true religion.

According to the authors of this plan, the Spanish nation has no religion and declares itself atheist: expelling henceforth God from their chest and commits a social deicide.⁵⁰

The Nuncio viewed the Convention’s plan to secularize the state as a direct attack against the connection between the state and religion. Tedeschini equated the legal framework of a state to the existence of God and the spiritual supremacy of the Catholic Church. By removing Catholicism’s influence, Tedeschini believed only errors would follow. The Church did not view “freedom of religion” (meaning the state did not have an established religion) as “freedom for religion” (the Catholic Church’s special and traditional position in

⁵⁰ “No existe religión de Estado. La Iglesia Católica será considerada como corporación de derecho público. El mismo carácter podrán tener las demás confesiones religiosas cuando lo soliciten y, por su constitución y el número de sus miembros ofrezcan garantías de subsistencia.” Esaminiamo per parti questo articolo redatto in una forma assoluta e quasi aspri.

‘No existe religión de Estado.’ Che si vuol dire con questo? Logicamente esaminata questa proposizione viene ad essere universale e negativa e si risolve in questa altra: la religione dello stato non esiste. Dal che si deduce che nessun stato tiene o deve tenere una religione, il che è quanto dire che lo Stato è ateo: errore condannato dalla Chiesa e dalla stessa ragione. Lo stato come l’uomo dipende da Dio nella sua esistenza e nel suo governo e deve riconoscere questa dipendenza e rendergli il dovuto culto professando la unica vera religione.

Secondo gli autori dell’ante progetto la nazione spagnola non ha religione e si dichiara atea: espelle dunque Dio dal suo seno e commette perciò un vero deicidio sociale.” ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 136 Pos. 789, 58r.

the state was removed). Tedeschini wrote, “The article in question says that the freedom of thought remains guaranteed. This is false because what truly remains guaranteed is the freedom of error and irreligion.”⁵¹ Tedeschini, therefore, believed the Second Republic was declaring itself officially atheist, something the Nuncio could not accept. Tedeschini would work with a republican government, but that republic could not remove the Church from the political arena. Some in the Second Republic wanted to end Church influence completely, and Tedeschini could not accept this. The perceived attacks of the Republic against the Church were enough to sound greater alarm-bells for the Papal Nuncio in Madrid. While the Vatican knew of provisions such as this, it did not respond publicly to these concerns. Instead, it relied on its Spanish hierarchy to present its own protests. Cardinal Secretary of State Pacelli thanked Tedeschini on 11 August for reporting on religion’s deteriorating condition in Spain, but he gave no major directive as to how the Spanish Catholic hierarchy should go about dealing with the scenario.⁵² The Spanish hierarchy was quite concerned about the changes in Spain, but the Vatican hierarchy did not offer concrete plans of action for the Spanish Church to deal with these problems.

The Catholic Press began to report on the situation in Spain and presented its opinions about the conditions. One of the main concerns for the press was the perceived increase of Bolshevik ideology. As Socialists gained more influence in the government, Catholic periodicals began to show worry about the possible increase of Soviet interference, particularly in an era when it appeared that communism was on the offensive. The periodical *La Civiltà Cattolica* made its concerns about the Republic clear. On 10 July 1931 the newspaper wrote of the increased Bolshevik interference within Spain that was geared at trying to undermine the role of the Church.⁵³ Bolshevism and Socialism were not separate for the Catholic periodicals when they discussed Spain. The fear was the Soviet Union would use its connections through its Communist International to make Spain even more hostile to the Catholic Church by establishing a purely atheistic state. Three months later, on 31 October, *La Civiltà Cattolica* continued its warnings about the Republic:

The question that is now debated in Spain, is not a simple manifestation of hostility against this or that Religious Order; it is a real declaration of war to the Catholic Church and to everything that it represents; open war, official, with no lenitives other than those inspired in

⁵¹ “L’articolo in parola dice che rimane garantita la libertà di coscienza. Questo è falso, perchè quello che con tale disposizione resta garantita è la libertà dell’errore e de la irreligione.” ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 136 Pos. 789, 60v.

⁵² ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 136 Pos. 789, 8r.

⁵³ “Il Comunismo Sovietico e la Rivoluzione Spagnuola,” *La Civiltà Cattolica*, 10 July 1931, Volume III, page 123.

satanic politics, aimed at bringing surely the strike and turn the ruining irreparable.⁵⁴

According to *La Civiltà Cattolica*, the Republic's actions were not only against the Religious Orders, but the government had struck out against any and all Catholic practices in Spain.

La Civiltà Cattolica was not the only publication that feared the possible influence of Bolshevism in the Republic. The more liberal *L'Esprit International*, in its unsigned article "Le Changement de Régime en Espagne" mentioned its concerns about the possible growing closeness to Soviet Communism and the Republic.⁵⁵ The article explained that by reducing Catholic influence in Spain, Soviet Bolshevism would attempt to fill the void. While the Holy See had not directly spoken out against the Republic, media sympathetic to the Catholic Church began to warn about the new direction of the Republic, especially when the threat of communism and Bolshevism seemed to appear. In reality, socialism—more than Bolshevism—gained a foothold in Spain, but political ideologies that could reduce religious influence were all seen as enemies of the Church—even if their clear political intentions had not been made obvious.

While the separation or removal of the Catholic Church from the Spanish State represented a major shift in the Spanish legal codes, it was Article 26 of the Spanish Constitution that created the most heated debate in the Convention and for the Catholic Church. The article states:

All religious confessions will be considered associations governed by a special law. The state, the regions, provinces and municipalities will not maintain, favor or support economically any church, religious association or institution.

A special law will regulate the total elimination of the clerical budget within a maximum of two years. All religious orders will be dissolved who impose, in addition to the three canonical vows, another special vow of obedience and authority different from the authority of the state. Their goods will be nationalized and devoted to charity and education.

⁵⁴ "La questione che ora si dibatte nella Spagna, non è una semplice manifestazione di ostilità contro questo o quell'Ordine religioso; è una vera dichiarazione di guerra alla Chiesa Cattolica e a tutto ciò ch'essa rappresenta; guerra aperta, ufficiale senz'altre attenuazioni che non siano quella ispirate da una politica satanica, per menare più sicuramente il colpo e rendere irreparabile la rovina." "La Bufera Anticlericale Spanguola" *La Civiltà Cattolica*, 31 October 1931, Volume IV, p. 225.

⁵⁵ "Le Changement de Régime en Espagne" *L'Esprit Internationale*, 20 October 1931, Number 20.

Other religious orders will be regulated by a special law to be voted by the Constituent Cortes that will correspond to the following principles:

1. Dissolution of all orders whose activities may constitute a danger to the security of the state.
2. Registration of those allowed to continue in a special registry of the Ministry of Justice.
3. Prohibition of acquiring or maintaining, either in their own name or in those of separate parties, any property beyond what can be proved to be necessary to maintain their members and direct fulfillment of their specific activities.
4. Prohibition of the right to participate in industry, commerce or education.
5. Subjection to all the fiscal laws of the land.
6. The obligation to make an annual report to the state on the involvement of their assets in relation to the goals of the association.

The property of religious orders is legally subject to nationalization.⁵⁶

This article designed sweeping changes to Spain's relationship with the Church. No longer would religious orders educate children, something controversial in a state where the public education system was still not fully developed.⁵⁷ Most importantly, this provision promised to dissolve any religious orders that had allegiances to a power other than the Spanish State—such as the Society of Jesus.⁵⁸ Even though delegates from the political Left had a large majority in the Convention, some Republican supporters disapproved of this provision, leading to the President of the Government, Alcalá Zamora, resigning his post in protest.⁵⁹ The debates in the Convention showed not all Spaniards, and

⁵⁶ Payne, *op.cit.*, 81-2.

⁵⁷ Payne, *op.cit.*, 82 and Sandie Holguín, *Creating Spaniards: Cultural and National Identity in Republican Spain* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002).

⁵⁸ Payne, *op.cit.*, 83.

⁵⁹ The creation of the Republican Constitution, and particularly the debate surrounding Article 26 (originally designated as Article 24 during its debate), sparked the most serious debate about the role of religion in Republican Spain. Devout Spanish Catholics, with the help of their clergy, sent almost three million notes to the Constitutional Convention to request the body act respectfully towards the Church. As Fernando de Meer Lecha Marzo explains in his book *La Constitución de la II República: Autonomías, Propiedad, Iglesia, Enseñanza* (Pamplona: EUNSA, 1978), 131-165, the anticlerical actions of the Convention resulted from a fear of Spain's past. Radical Socialists and Socialists believed Catholic thought was incompatible with the modern ideals the Republic needed to represent. Therefore, the Constitution needed to prevent the Church from dominating Spanish society, and Article 26 was a logical action. According to de Meer and others, Article 26 was an intentional Republican plan to handcuff the authority of the Church, resulting in greater social and cultural conflict. Frances Lannon explains that while certain Church

not all Republicans wanted the provision to succeed, but for the Church, the sheer suggestion of this provision was a blatant attack against Catholicism.

While the debates leading towards the passage of Article 26 were occurring in the Constitutional Convention, Catholic leaders and the Papal Nuncio expressed their anxieties about the possible legislation to the Holy See. In a 16 September letter, Tedeschini expressed his worry about the possible passage of Article 26. His letter came days after a failed meeting with the Justice Minister Álvaro de Albornoz Liminiana to persuade the Republic not to adopt “anticlerical” articles in the Constitution. Tedeschini wrote, “Preservation of Religious Congregations is a grave battle. But [the Church] will defend preservation in totality, warning however that if the specific situation regarding the Society of Jesus is raised [survival] is ninety per cent negative.”⁶⁰ While the debates over Article 26 raised numerous issues, including the education of children and the ability of the Church to have businesses, the fate of the Jesuits in Spain was the most daunting issue for the Vatican because the Republic directly targeted religious orders that maintained special and direct vows of obedience to foreign powers, such as to the Pope. The next day, Secretary of State Pacelli responded and requested its Nuncio in Spain take public action against this

entities—like its educational system—had become quite unpopular, the manner chosen by the Republic to reduce Catholic influence was not beneficial. She writes, “The Constitutional attack on the Church in fact did the republic more harm than the Church itself; it was counter-effective in its mobilization of a mass Catholic opposition; it was inept in its method and timing. But the fear and determination that inspired it were neither misplaced nor exaggerated. The Church was a danger to the democratic and modernizing republic well before the republic tried, futilely, to disarm it,” Lannon, *op.cit.*, 186. As Lannon explains, this battle with the Church in the form of Article 26 was a long time coming—even before the creation of the Republic. As William J. Callahan explains about this Constitutional Article, “There was nothing new about the fundamental issue at stake. The problem of reconciling the right of free association and liberty of conscience with the powers of the State ran through the discussions, as they had done repeatedly since the triumph of liberalism during the 1930s. Although deputies of all persuasions advanced innumerable cultural, historical, social, and economic arguments in their highly charged exchanges, the question was straightforward. Where would the regalist pendulum stop—at an expanded version of the moderate regalism of the Restoration or at the more radical form implemented by the liberals of the 1830s who suppressed the male orders outright,” Callahan, *op.cit.*, 288. As with previous attempts to secularize, clericals pushed back. While the Vatican hierarchy did not lead the specific protests against the Spanish Constitution of 1931, it knew it had allies in Spain that would act on its behalf. Radical Socialists and Socialists might have believed the only way to completely modernize the state would be to extinguish all Catholic influence, but this would have been nearly impossible, and the Republican leadership must have known resistance would come in one form or another. This fight over religious influence was the next logical step.

⁶⁰ “Conservazione Congregazioni Religiosi è battaglia grave. Ma essa difenderà conservazione di tutte in blocco, avvertendo però che se si suscita questione concreta Compagnia di Gesù novanta probabilità su cento sono per la negativa.” ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 118 Fasc. 784, 33r.

possible article by working with Spanish Catholic Action, but he did not lead the protest.⁶¹ The Holy See's lack of public commentary highlights the fact that it did not want to broaden the conflict in the media, but keep it within the normal paths of formal diplomacy. If the Holy See had spoken out, Radical Socialists may have used those words as evidence for the necessity of this provision.

The Vatican requested the Papal Nuncio become more active in his protests against Article 26. In an 11 October letter to Pacelli, Tedeschini wrote of his meeting with Lerroux regarding the possible passage of the article. He reported that even though some of the Provisional Government, like Lerroux, did not want acceptance of such a article, it did not seem as if the Church would foster enough votes to stop it.⁶² Even though the Church's ability to prevent the passage of Article 26 was diminishing each day, the Vatican was not willing to give up on the Jesuits. On 12 October, Pacelli wrote to Tedeschini in the name of Pope Pius XI. Pacelli stated that the Holy See was unwilling to sacrifice any religious order in Spain, particularly the Society of Jesus (Jesuits). He continued by writing that the Nuncio should attempt to persuade Spanish Bishops to take up the cause to protect religious societies in Spain by directing their followers to speak out against antireligious aspects of the proposed Spanish Constitution.⁶³ The Vatican, in response to Article 26, accepted a grassroots plan to protest the passage of this possible law, particularly in defense of its religious orders. This attempted protest, however, did not pay off for the Church. Tedeschini reported to the Vatican on 13 October that the grave situation had gotten worse as the "Socialist Party and Radical Socialists in yesterday's meeting have decided to vote for the integral article to dissolve religious orders and confiscate property."⁶⁴ According to Tedeschini, after days of heated debate and exchanges, the leadership of the Socialists was to blame for the passage of the Article.⁶⁵

⁶¹ "Attende pure che Conferenza emetta conveniente protesta contro offesa fatte alla Chiesa e si pronunzi in favore Ordini e Congregazioni Religiose, compresa Compagnia di Gesù." ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 118 Pos. 784, 35r.

⁶² ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 118 Pos. 784, 68r.

⁶³ ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 118 Pos. 784, 69r. Vatican statements from this note clarify that the Papal Nuncio acted as a direct representative of the Vatican hierarchy while Spanish Bishops had greater autonomy in their decisions.

⁶⁴ "Partito socialista e radicale socialista nella riunione di ieri hanno deciso votare integralmente articolo dissoluzione ordini religiosi e confiscazione beni." ASV: AES, Spagna: Fasc. 118 Pos. 784, 70r.

⁶⁵ Tedeschini's reaction that the Socialists were to blame for the passage of Article 26 was correct, but it was not as simple as that. As Manuel Álvarez Tardío explains, not all socialists agreed upon how radical the Article should be, and days of debate followed. In the end, Radical Socialists did not get the full authority to dismantle all religious orders, like they had wanted. Conservative Republicans were not able to prevent the Article from passing. President Alcalá-Zamora believed that the success of the Republican revolution was something for all Spaniards to enjoy, and constitutional provisions like Article 26 were unnecessary. Manuel Azaña viewed the discussion of Article 26 as purely political and not an infringement into religious rights, separating

The sources from the Secret Archive of the Vatican support some conclusions about the Holy See's reactions towards this new government in its first months. At the Republic's inception, the Holy See viewed the new government with caution and speculation, just like many Spaniards. The early communications between the Papal Nuncio in Madrid and the Holy See contained enthusiasm for a group of men, like Lerroux and Alcalá Zamora, but apprehension about the influence of the political Left in the new Spanish government. The Holy See did not react conclusively towards this new regime, but appeared to take a wait-and-see attitude. However, it does appear that serious miscommunications began to occur. The Republican Government viewed violence against the Church as random and uncontrollable mobs that could not be stopped. For the Church, because many of the mobs had Republican sympathies, the government was at least tacitly condoning, or even leading, these actions. This attitude, however, would be tested as the Provisional Government faced its next major concern—the creation of a Spanish Constitution.

At its inception, the future of the Second Republic was uncertain. The Vatican had received reports from its Papal Nuncio on the confusing situation during the first weeks of the Republic, but the communications became more distressed once the Republic began to draft its Constitution. The hope in men like Lerroux and Alcalá Zamora began to deteriorate after the Vatican better understood their supporters were outnumbered in the government and parliament. The Vatican representatives, under the directives of Pope Pius XI and Cardinal Secretary of State, protested the language of Article 26. As the evidence has shown, though, the Vatican's directives for its Spanish hierarchy were not enough to prevent the passage of certain provisions, including the approval of Article 26. The formal diplomacy, on which the Vatican had relied, did not garner results for the Holy See. Even though the Vatican did not win this battle, it relied on its diplomatic representatives because they appeared to be the only possible avenue for the Church to express its concerns. Formal diplomatic channels would prevent the Holy See from being targeted as an outside power attempting to control the Republican Government, hence preventing the need for Article 26. This Article represented a major dilemma for the Holy See. If speaking out was seditious, and silence was weakness, it was difficult to determine what the Holy See should have done to protect Catholicism in Spain. Most seriously, with the ratification of the Republican Constitution, the groundwork for future legislation hostile towards the Church had been established. The Constitution would allow

himself from the concerns of Alcalá-Zamora. In the end, Álvarez Tardío explains that the more-or-less passive attitude of the centrist parties allowed Article 26 to pass. Therefore, it was not just the socialists who helped Article 26 succeed, but socialists did not manage to get all they wanted out of the provision. Álvarez Tardío, *op.cit.*, 173-195.

the Republican Government to reduce other Catholic privileges in Spain during the period of the First Republican Government.